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Summary of portfolio 
Section A gives an overview of the endorsement, and impact, of biomedical explanations 
of depression. The review found a weak endorsement of biomedical causal beliefs 
among lay populations. Professionals were more likely to endorse biomedical and 
causes. Biomedical beliefs were associated with increased medical help-seeking and 
reduced blame. They were also shown to increase stigmatising attitudes and reduce 
preference for psychosocial interventions. The review highlighted a lack of research 
examining professional attitudes.  Clinical and research implications are given. 
 
Section B describes an experimental study into the effect of labelling depression as 
biological versus psychosocial on clinical judgements and attitudes. Data was analysed 
using ANOVA. There was small effect of labelling the depression as biological on causal 
beliefs and judgements of treatment effectiveness.  Observational analysis showed that 
traineesǯ causal beliefs about the depression had a large effect on judgements. Biological 
causal beliefs were associated with increased judgements of effectiveness for 
medication, ECT and hospitalisation and lower perceptions of engagement in 
psychological therapy.  Findings and limitations are discussed within a research and 
clinical context. 
 
Section C provides a critical and reflective appraisal of the empirical study and the 
candidates learning and development throughout the process of the research. Future 
research ideas and clinical implications of the project are discussed. 
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Abstract 
Introduction. 
Biomedical models of mental illness (MI) abound. These have been proposed as helpful 
in reducing stigma and increasing help-seeking. Research suggests that the 
consequences of biomedical models of MI are not uniformly positive. Context is given 
regarding the endorsement and implications of biomedical models of MI amongst lay 
and professional populations.  
Aims.  
The review explored the endorsement of biomedical causal beliefs for depression, in lay 
and professional populations, and the impact of these beliefs on stigma, treatment 
preferences and help-seeking. 
Methods. 
Five electronic databases were searched for relevant peer-reviewed articles using 
keywords. Articles were included if they measured participants biomedical causal 
beliefs about depression. Twenty-four studies were identified (1991-2011). 
Findings. 
Although findings were mixed, the review suggests a strong endorsement of 
psychosocial causal beliefs among lay populations. Professionals and people with severe 
depression were more likely to endorse biomedical causes. Biomedical beliefs were 
associated with increased medical help-seeking and reduced blame for depression. 
Biomedical beliefs were also associated with stigmatising attitudes and reduced 
preference for psychosocial and self-initiated interventions. Methodological rigour and 
conclusiveness of findings varied across studies. There was a paucity of studies 
examining professional attitudes.  Clinical and research implications are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Biomedical explanations of MI 
Biomedical models were first popularised in the late 19th Century following the 
discovery that syphilis can cause psychotic symptoms and that certain traits and 
syndromes are heritable (Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000).  Their popularity faded following 
their association with eugenic movements in Nazi Germany (Barondes, 1998).  The 
advent of psychotropic drugs in the 1950ǯs and 1960ǯs led to a resurgence of biomedical 
theories of MI, such as the serotonin-inactivity model of depression (Borup, Meidahl, 
Petersen & Yangtorp, 1982).  Since the ͳͻͻͲǯs, increased understanding of the brain and 
genetics has led to a renewed optimism for finding a biological basis for MI and a 
medical cure.  More than 20 years on, there is still little evidence for a genetic or 
biochemical cause (Hindmarch, 2001; Double, 2004; France, Lysaker & Robinson, 
2007).   )ntegrated Ǯbiopsychosocialǯ models of MI have been widely adopted within 
clinical psychology (Read, 2005).  These models have been criticised for reducing 
psychosocial factors to mere triggers of exaggerated genetic predispositions (Read, 
2005; Joseph, 2006).   
Endorsement of biomedical explanations of MI 
In a large review of studies, Angermeyer & Matschinger (1999) found that lay 
people tend to view MI from a wholly psychosocial perspective. This has been a 
consistent finding (van Dorn, Swanson, Elbogen &Schwartz, 2005; Read, Haslem, Sayce 
& Davies, 2006).  Mental health professionals have been shown to put more emphasis 
on biomedical causes of MI than the public (van Dorn, Swanson, Elbogen &Swartz, 2005; 
Read, Haslem, Sayce and Davies, 2006). Public endorsement of biomedical explanations 
appears to be increasing.  Angermeyer & Matschinger (2005) found that, from 1990-
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2001, there was a 19% rise in the endorsement of ǲbrain diseaseǳ and ǲgeneticsǳ as 
causes of MI. 
Understanding causal beliefs in MI – Theory 
Research has suggested that having an explanation for behaviour encourages the 
perception of the behaviour as normal – ǲthe understanding it makes it normal effectǳ 
(Meehl, 1973).  In an experimental study, Kim & LoSavio (2000) found that people 
judged MIs as more normal and common if a causal explanation was given.   They 
suggested that the effect operates in a similar way to the ǲsimulation heuristicǳ 
(Kahneman &Tversky, 1982); which stipulates that an event is judged as more likely to 
occur if a causal scenario can be easily constructed. 
Attribution theory is a framework for understanding the impact of causal 
attributions in MI (Weiner, 1983; 1985; 1995).  Attribution research suggests that the 
stability and controllability of events affect causal attributions (Weiner, 1983; 1995).  
Perceiving negative experiences as uncontrollable reduces personal responsibility and 
maintains self-esteem (Wiener, 1983).     Biomedical explanations for MI have been 
associated with lower perceived control and reduced perceptions of blame and 
responsibility (Schmidt & Weiner, 1988; Rush, 1998).  Medical illnesses may also be 
perceived to be more stable leading to reduced hope for full recovery (Anthony, 1994).  
Seligman (1975) proposed that holding a pessimistic attributional style, where negative 
events are viewed as stable and uncontrollable, can be causal in depression through a process of ǲlearned helplessness.ǳ   
Clinical Implications - Treatment 
Clinicians predict the effectiveness of treatment interventions using formulations 
of the causal and maintaining factors in a clientǯs distress (Sloman, 2005).  Treatments 
which match causal explanations are judged to be more effective, as are treatments 
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which act on initial causes rather than symptoms or effects (Yopchick & Kim, 2009).  
DeKwaadsteniet, Hagmayer, Krol & Witteman (2010) found that professional causal 
beliefs can lead to bias in the choice of interventions and a disregard of the evidence-
base.  Strongly endorsing biological attributions has been shown to predict professional 
preference for pharmacotherapy, hospitalisation and ECT (Read & Harre, 2001).   
Lay causal theories also predict treatment preference, with people tending to 
seek treatments which are congruent with their causal explanations (Read et al., 2006; 
Furnham, 1991).  Congruence may be important in treatment outcomes; clients who 
hold biological causal beliefs have demonstrated worse outcomes in psychological 
interventions (Cottraux, Messy, Marks & Bouvard, 1993; Lax, Basoglu and Marks, 1992).   
Fisher and Farina (1979) found that biomedical beliefs about MI increase professional 
help-seeking whereas psychosocial models increase self-management.  
Jorm et al.  (1997) found significant discrepancies between public and 
professional perceptions of intervention helpfulness.  Professionals viewed medical 
treatments as more helpful than the public, and stress-management, yoga and 
relaxation as less helpful.  Discrepancy between professional and client beliefǯs has been 
shown to predict worse outcomes and reduced motivation for treatment (Buetler & 
Clarkin, 1990; Propst, 1980).    
Implications - Stigma 
Stigma is a process by which a set of people are labelled as different and are 
stereotyped, disempowered and discriminated against (Link and Phelan, 2001).  In a 
review of studies, Rusch, Angermeyer & Corrigan (2005) found high levels of MI stigma; 
people with schizophrenia were frequently viewed as dangerous and unpredictable and 
people with depression were often viewed as weak and incompetent.  They found self-
stigma was common in MI and included perceptions of personal responsibility, 
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weakness and low-self efficacy.   Self-stigma was associated with a failure to seek help. 
Stigma is also a significant problem amongst mental health professionals (Gray & Gray, 
2002; Schulze, 2007).  In a review of studies, Schulze (2007) found mental health 
professionals attitudes to be the same as, or more negative than, public attitudes.   
Studies examining stigma in MI have found a relationship between biomedical 
beliefs and negative attitudes such as ǲdangerousnessǳ and ǲunpredictabilityǳ (Read and 
Law, 1999; Read & Harre, 2001, Walker & Read, 2002), ǲsocial distanceǳ (Golding, 
Becker, Sherman, Rappaport, 1975) and ǲirresponsibilityǳ (Schwartz & Schwartz, 1977).   
Illness beliefs are also associated with self-stigma leading people to see themselves as ǲalienǳ and less acceptable as a friend (Farina, Fisher, Getter & Fischer, 1978).  
Professionals endorsing a biological perspective have been shown to view the client as 
more pathological (Kent & Read, 1998).  In an experimental study, Lam, Salkovskis & 
Warwick (2005) found that psychological explanations reduced judgements of risk, 
disability and severity of MI.  However, the effects of biomedical explanations are not 
uniformly negative; they have been associated with feelings of self-respect, better self-
esteem and lower perceptions of blame (Farina et al., 1978; Read et al., 2006).   
Anti-stigma campaigns.  Education is a key strategy for reducing stigma 
(Mayville & Penn, 1998).  In 2002, the National Alliance of Mental Illness   promoted the message: ǲmental illness is a brain diseaseǳ in an American anti-stigma campaign 
(Watson, & Corrigan, 2005).  Attribution theory has been used to argue that such ǲillness like any otherǳ approaches will improve attitudes by reducing perceptions of 
control, responsibility and blame (Read et al., 2006).  In the UK, biochemical and illness 
models of MI are also popular methods in reducing stigma (ǲDefeat Depressionǳ, 1992-ͳͻͻ͸; ǲChanging Minds Campaignǳ, 1998-2003; ǲTime to Changeǳ, 2008-2013).  Positive 
outcomes from such campaigns have been limited (Rusch et al., 2005).  Mehta & Farina, 
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(1997) argued that medical illness analogies, used in such campaigns, increase stigma as 
they encourage perceptions of people with MI as ǲphysically distinct.ǳ 
Biomedical models and diagnostic labelling  
Diagnostic labelling is a key outcome of the biomedical model of mental health 
used within psychiatry and general practice.  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual allows mental health diagnoses to be made on the basis of clusters of ǲsymptomsǳ which 
assume an underlying disease or illness (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  It 
has been argued that diagnostic labels are an efficient way to distinguish clients based 
on identifiable characteristics, which enable inferences to be made regarding causal 
aetiology and in turn allows the effectiveness of interventions to be predicted (Corrigan 
& Penn, 1999).   
  A number of critics have argued that the absence of biological or physical 
markers for mental health diagnoses such as depression, make the biomedical notion of 
mental illness confused or mythological (Boyle, 1990; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999). The 
disease model of diagnosis has also been contradicted by a lack of evidence for effective 
and specific medical treatments (Moncrieff & Cohen, 2005).  These critics argue that 
depression is a scientifically invalid construct which enables a stigmatising process of 
labelling and medicalising normal human experience.  Nonetheless, the use of diagnostic 
labels has also become an increasingly prominent feature of psychological services 
(Boyle, 2007). It has been suggested that the increasing use of diagnosis has led to 
psychological models of emotional distress being increasingly biomedical or illness 
based (Read, 2005). 
  Diagnostic labelling has been criticised due to its implications for stigma. 
Goffman (1963) described stigma as a social process in which individuals are labelled 
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with an attribute which is discrediting or shameful. In the context of diagnosis, stigma occurs when the person is labelled as ǲillǳ and is perceived to be different from the norm 
in a socially significant way.  The process of diagnostic labelling involves a subjective 
value-judgement by mental health professionals, who hold the power to make diagnosis 
and clinical decisions.   The process of labelling and clinical decision-making is also 
influenced by organisational factors, such as the current introduction of mental health 
clustering and payment by results within the National Health Service in the UK.   In turn, 
these organisational features are influenced by societal and political factors such as 
economic pressures or marketing by drug companies. Thus, in considering aetiological 
influences on clinical-judgements, the wider political and systemic landscape needs to 
be held in mind. 
Review 
Aims 
The current review explores the impact of biomedical causal beliefs on public and 
professional attitudes towards depression and its treatment. As previously discussed, 
the concept of diagnosis and the construct of mental illnesses, such as depression, have 
been contested. However, the notion that depression is a diagnosable illness is common 
and the current review aims to explore the implications of endorsing a biomedical or 
illness explanation of depression. Depression is the most widely diagnosed MI (Murray 
& Lopez, 1996).   Stigma is a significant problem in depression and is associated with 
not seeking help (Schomerus, Matschinger, & Angermeyer, 2009).  Beliefs about causes 
of depression are broad and include: interpersonal causes (e.g. relationship difficulties), 
environmental causes (e.g. stress), developmental causes (e.g. childhood abuse), 
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intrapersonal factors (e.g. attributional style), religious/spiritual causes (e.g. Godǯs will) 
and biomedical causes (e.g. chemical-imbalance; Addis, Traux, & Jacobson, 1995).   
The review aims to answer the following questions: 
a.) To what extent do the general public and professionals endorse biomedical/illness 
explanations as a cause of depression? 
b.) Do biomedical causal beliefs impact attitudes towards treatment and help-seeking? 
c.) Do biomedical causal beliefs impact stigma?  
 
Methods 
 Detailed information regarding search methodology can be found in the 
appendix (A, p.102).  Peer-reviewed articles were included if they measured biomedical 
causes of depression and addressed any of the review aims.   Five electronic databases: 
PsycINFO, Ovid MEDLINE, Cochrane library, Web of Science and ESBCOhost, were 
searched using the following keywords ȋplus synonymsȌ: ǲbiological beliefsǳ OR ǲbiomedical beliefsǯǯ OR ǲillness beliefsǯǯ AND ǲdepressionǳ AND/OR ǲattitudesǳ OR ǲstigmaǳ OR ǲtreatment preferenceǳ OR ǲhelp-seekingǳ  
Twenty-four relevant studies were identified (published 1991-2011).  For a description 
of the studies see Appendix (B, p.103), and see Table 7(Appendix C, p.104) for an outline 
of the main findings,). 
Large-Scale Surveys 
Lay populations.   McKeon and Carrick (1991) found two-thirds of the people 
they interviewed did not perceive depression to be an illness.  Causal beliefs about 
depression reflected a psychosocial understanding, with stress and bereavement being 
most commonly cited.  Only 9% mentioned ǲchemical-imbalanceǳ as a causal factor.  
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Participants expressed few negative attitudes towards depression and 73% felt it could 
be successfully treated.  The authors conclude that the lack of illness explanations for 
depression explains the low prevalence of stigmatising attitudes.   This conclusion goes 
beyond the data in their study as they did not find any significant association, or causal 
link, between illness beliefs and stigmatising attitudes.   
Jorm et al., (1997) assessed beliefs about depression and schizophrenia through 
the use of case vignettes. The most common causal explanations for both vignettes were 
day-to-day stressors, trauma and bereavement.   Half of the sample endorsed ǲgeneticsǳ 
as being causal in depression and the same number endorsed ǲweakness of characterǳ.  
Participants who correctly recognised the vignette as depression made more social 
attributions and were less likely to endorse ǲweakness of characterǳ.  The findings 
suggest that holding a social understanding of depression is associated with better 
recognition and a less negative evaluation of the sufferer.   However, the authors did not 
directly test this association.   
Paykel, Hart & Priest (1998) evaluated the ǲDefeat Depressionǳ campaign (UK: 
1991-1996) which utilised an illness approach. The authors compared household 
attitude surveys from 1991 and 1997. The authors conclude that between these time-
points illness beliefs became more common therefore demonstrating an increase in 
favourable attitudes to depression.  Yet, it is not clear that viewing depression as an 
illness is synonymous with favourable attitudes.  Examining the survey results shows 
there was no change in the percentage of people who viewed people with depression as ǲmad/unstableǳ and there was a decrease in the percentage who thought depressed 
people ǲdeserve more support from family and friends.ǳ There was a 10% increase in 
the number of people endorsing ǲbiological changes in the brainǳ (43% in 1997).  
Endorsement of anti-depressant treatment also increased significantly over the time 
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period.  Willingness to seek professional help increased by 8% from 1991-1997. 
However, there was no reduction in the number of people who would feel embarrassed 
to see a GP (62%).    
The evaluation is limited by the number of multiple comparisons made without 
adjustment of the significance level.   In addition, ǲdonǯt knowǳ answers were collapsed 
into the ǲdisagreeǳ category.  This may have inflated the percentage change in positive 
attitudes; people who answered donǯt know to statements such as ǲdepressed people 
are mad/unstableǳ would have been counted as having a favourable attitude.  This is 
particularly problematic in the context of social desirability in face-to-face interviews.  
Although the campaign led to increased medical help-seeking, it does not appear that the ǲillness-like-any-otherǳ approach was effective in reducing stigma.   
Lauber, Falcato, Nordt & Rossler (2003) conducted a telephone survey in which 
they asked people to generate possible causes of depression for a case vignette.  
Psychosocial explanations were the most commonly cited.  Illness explanations were 
also common in this sample and cited by 25%.  In contrast to Jorm et al., (1997), 
recognition of the vignette as depression correlated with higher ratings of heredity and 
illness explanations.  This difference may reflect an increase in illness beliefs over time.   
Jorm and Griffiths (2008) conducted a survey exploring stigma towards 
depression and schizophrenia.  Stigma was conceptualised as ǲdangerousnessǳ and ǲsocial distance.ǳ They found a link between biomedical explanations and stigma for 
schizophrenia but not for depression.  However, dangerousness may be less relevant in 
depression stigma (Rusch et al., 2005).   When vignettes were labelled as ǲdepression,ǳ 
there was a trend towards biomedical explanations leading to a greater desire for social 
distance compared to psychosocial explanations. 
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Pescosolido et al.  (2010) compared attitudes to MI on the 1996 and 2006 
American General Social Survey.  Participants were randomly assigned one of three 
vignettes (schizophrenia, depression or alcohol dependence).   They found that 
significantly more people endorsed biological explanations of all three vignettes in 
2006.   For depression, there was a 13% rise in chemical-imbalance explanations and a 
12% increase in genetic explanations.  Seventy-two per cent of participants in 2006 
viewed depression as an illness compared to 65% in 1996.   Participants were 10% 
more likely to state the depressed individual needed to see a psychiatrist and 9% more 
likely to state they need medication.  Stigma remained high across time-points. 
Biomedical attitudes were found to be either unrelated to stigma, or to lead to an  
increase in negative attitudes. Endorsing biomedical explanations for depression was 
associated with viewing the depressed person as more dangerous and an increased 
desire for social distance. 
The 1990ǯs in American was designated the ǲdecade of the brainǳ based on the 
assumption that advances in neuroscience would hold the key to understanding mental 
illnesses and reducing stigma (Jones & Mendell, 1999).  The results of this study suggest 
that although endorsement of biological explanations and medical treatment for 
depression increased significantly in America between 1996 and 2006, stigmatising 
attitudes remained fixed.   
Depressed populations.  In a UK survey, Ogden et al.  (1999) found that GPs 
equally endorsed both biomedical and psychological causes of depression whereas 
patients more frequently endorsed psychosocial reasons.   Patients who had 
experienced depression had similar beliefs to GPs.   This suggests that people who have 
been depressed view biomedical causes as more relevant in their explanation for 
depression.  The authors do not investigate this finding and there are a number of 
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possible explanations.  Firstly, people who experience depression may have a more 
pessimistic attributional style which is congruent with biomedical explanations.   
Secondly, having depression leads to a shift in causal attributions to reduce feelings of 
blame.  Thirdly, GPs provide psycho-education to patients which encourages a 
biomedical conceptualisation of symptoms.  Finally, pharmacological treatment may 
lead to a shift in causal beliefs to promote congruency.  
Budd, James & Hughes (2008) surveyed service-usersǯ explanations for their 
depression and perceived helpfulness of interventions.  The most important causes 
were: bereavement, biochemical-imbalance, and sexual abuse.  Stronger endorsement of 
a biochemical-imbalance explanation of depression was associated with greater 
perceived helpfulness of medication.  There were no other associations between 
treatment beliefs and causal explanations. This study suggests that biochemical 
explanations, in combination with personal trauma, are important in service-usersǯ 
explanations for depression and preference for anti-depressant treatment.  The findings 
of this study may not generalise to the wider population of people experiencing 
depression, as these participants had long histories of depression (average of 17 years) 
and had attempted multiple treatments. 
Hansson, Chotai & Bodlund (2010) surveyed patients with depression from 46 
health centres across Sweden.  The most commonly cited causes for depression were 
stress and personality. Biological causes were cited by just 3.6%.  Despite the low 
endorsement of biological causes 83% of participants were prescribed anti-depressants 
compared to 9% receiving psychotherapy.   
Single-Site Surveys and Observational Studies 
Lay populations.   In contrast to previous studies, Goldstein & Rosselli (2003) 
found an association between biological beliefs and more positive attitudes to 
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depression, in a sample of American students.  Factor analysis of generated causes for 
depression demonstrated three models of aetiology representing biological, 
environmental and psychological beliefs, with the biological factor being most strongly 
endorsed.  Holding a biological model of depression was associated with reduced 
perceptions of blame, more positive beliefs towards depression, greater help-seeking 
and greater perceived effectiveness of psychotherapy.  In contrast, psychological models 
were associated with increased blame and desire for social distance.  
France, Lysaker & Robinson (2007) also found that American undergraduates 
strongly endorse biomedical causes of depression.   In a free response task, chemical-
imbalance was the most commonly cited cause of depression. Over half the sample 
rated chemical-imbalance as the primary cause of depression.  Those endorsing the 
chemical-imbalance explanation were more likely to seek-help help from a range of 
mental health professionals.  The high endorsement of chemical-imbalance explanations 
in American samples may reflect the high prevalence of direct-to-consumer advertising 
for anti-depressants and the resulting exposure to the chemical-imbalance hypothesis 
(Hinshaw, 2006). 
In a similar study, Nieuwsma & Pepper (2010) explored the impact of etiological 
beliefs on stigma, self-efficacy, and treatment effectiveness in American 
undergraduates.  The most important causal factors in depression were rated as 
negative life events, recent misfortunes and a chemical-imbalance.  People who 
endorsed psychosocial explanations were more likely to view self-initiated treatments 
as effective.  There was a trend towards endorsing a biological explanation of 
depression and greater perceived effectiveness of medication.  No significant 
association was found between causal explanations and stigma.   
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  Wong, Tran, Kim, Kerne & Calfa (2010) conducted a survey examining Asian-
Americanǯs attitudes to mental health.  Participants were presented with a depression 
vignette and asked to provide possible labels, causes, consequences, and solutions for 
the difficulties.  Content analysis determined the most commonly cited causes were 
interpersonal.  Biological reasons and contextual causes were associated with 
professional help-seeking. Logistical regression found that those endorsing biological 
reasons were 1.65 times more likely to seek professional help.   
Depressed populations.  Srinivasan, Cohen & Parikh (2003) surveyed 
psychiatric outpatients.  Participants identified stress or negative life events and 
cognitive style as partial causes for their depression whereas biomedical causes were 
not endorsed.   Women were more likely than men to endorse ǲbiological abnormalityǳ 
as a cause.   The authors argue that low endorsement of biological explanations explains 
poor compliance with anti-depressant treatment.  This study lacks measures of 
medication compliance and/or treatment preferences which might have provided evidence for the authorsǯ conclusion.  In addition, all causal ratings were very low.    The 
few, broad causes of depression used in this study may not have encompassed the many 
possible explanatory reasons people hold for depression.  For instance, ǲbiological abnormalityǳ may, or may not, be viewed to include: chemical-imbalance, hormonal 
changes, brain damage and physical illness.   
Brown et al., (2007) examined the relationship between illness beliefs and 
functioning in service-users with mild-moderate depression.  The most strongly 
endorsed reason for depression was stress. Regression analysis demonstrated a 
significant correlation between medical illness beliefs and lower perceptions of control 
over symptoms and greater perceived consequences.  The conclusiveness of the findings 
is limited by the number of regression analysis conducted without directional 
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hypothesis or conservative p values.  Thus the small correlations found in this study 
appear unremarkable.   
Leykin, DeRubeis, Shelton & Amsterdam (2007) explored the impact of 
treatment (anti-depressant medication; ADM, versus cognitive therapy; CT) on 
participantsǯ beliefs about the causes of their depression following successful treatment.   
Participants were part of a RCT evaluating the effectiveness of CT.  Data on 
characterological beliefs (conceptually related to CT e.g. depressive thinking) and 
biomedical beliefs (e.g. chemical-imbalance) were collected on all participants in active 
treatment.   Characterological reasons were the most strongly endorsed reasons for 
depression across the sample, followed by childhood events and biological causes.  The 
high endorsement of characterological beliefs in this study contrasts with previous 
findings, suggesting it may be related the sample recruited for the RCT.  Causal beliefs 
were not significantly associated with treatment outcome although the authors report a 
trend towards higher biological beliefs and worse outcomes in CT.   Participants 
successfully treated with CT reported weaker biomedical beliefs post-treatment, 
whereas participants successfully treated with ADM reported weaker characterological 
beliefs.   The results suggest that successful treatment confirms treatment congruent 
beliefs and ǲweeds outǳ treatment incongruent beliefs.   
Meyer & Garcia-Roberts (2007) examined how congruence between reason-
giving for depression and treatment-type impacts motivation in patients receiving 
psychological therapy in the UK.  Cognitive reasons were the most commonly endorsed 
cause for depression.  Biological reason-giving varied significantly as a function of 
depression severity with the most severely depressed endorsing biological causes more 
than those with mild-moderate depression.   Congruence between reasons for 
depression and interventions increased treatment motivation.  People with severe 
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depression were more motivated for biological treatment and less motivated for 
interventions targeting childhood issues.   This supports previous findings that people 
with severe depression are more likely to hold biological explanations for depression 
and to be more motivated for biomedical treatments.  The reason for this is not clear; it 
seems feasible that people with severe depression may perceive their symptoms to be 
more stable leading to low self-efficacy.  A limitation of this study is that all participants 
were receiving psychological therapy, primarily CBT.  This bias may explain the high 
endorsement of cognitive reasons amongst participants.   
In a Deutsch study, Schweizer et al.  (2010) examined the impact of causal 
explanations on treatment preferences in a people diagnosed with major depression.   
Treatment options were: CBT, Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) or pharmacotherapy (PHT; 
pure or combined with therapy).   Biological reasons were the least cited cause of 
depression and pure PHT was the least popular treatment.  Intraindividual attributions 
were associated with a preference for CBT and biological attributions were associated 
with a preference for PHT.  Experience of ǲfailedǳ treatment attempts was associated 
with higher endorsement of biological explanations of depression. In the context of 
previous research it seems plausible that biological explanations help to reduce 
perceived responsibility for ǲfailingǳ treatment. 
In a similar study, Khasla, McCarthy, Sharpless, Barrett and Barber (2011) 
examined the link between causes for depression and treatment choice in participants 
with major depression who were recruited for an American RCT.  ǲChildhoodǳ and ǲcharacterologicalǳ were the most cited causes of depression, followed by ǲbiologicalǳ 
causes.   Participants from ethnic minorities were less likely to endorse biological 
explanations than Caucasians.  Regression analysis demonstrated an association 
between receiving previous treatment and higher endorsement of biological 
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attributions.  There was a trend towards strongly endorsing the biochemical-imbalance 
explanation of depression and a preference for medication.  Those who preferred 
psychotherapy were more likely to endorse childhood reasons as the cause of their 
depression. Forty-one per-cent of participants preferred anti-depressant treatment to 
psychotherapy, suggesting that for many people preference for medication was 
unrelated to causal attributions.   
Professionals.  Kuyken, Brewin, Power & Furnham (1992) compared causal 
beliefs about depression across clinical psychologists (CPs), depressed service-users 
(SUs), and lay people in Greater London. There was a significant difference in the 
frequency of biomedical responses between the three groups; 65% of SUs cited 
biomedical causes as a reason for depression compared to 48% of CPs and 14% of lay 
people.  CPs and SUs rated drug treatment as more effective than did lay people.  SUs 
and CPs viewed drug treatments to be as effective as psychotherapeutic and social 
interventions.  In contrast, lay people gave far lower efficacy ratings for medical 
treatment than for all other interventions.   
Quasi-Experimental and Experimental studies 
Lay populations.  Han, Chen, Hwang & Wei (2006) used an experimental design 
to evaluate the effectiveness of different educational messages on willingness to seek-
help amongst undergraduates in Taiwan.  Students were randomly assigned to four 
groups: biological education; de-stigmatisation education; combined; or a no education 
control group.  Participants in the experimental groups were asked to read a paragraph 
on depression along with information on its biological aetiology and/or educational 
material aimed at reducing perceived blame. The authors developed three 
questionnaires to examine biological attribution, blame and help-seeking willingness.  
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Biological education significantly increased willingness to seek help. The de-
stigmatisation education reduced personal blame but did not influence help-seeking.  
There are a number of limitations of this study.  Firstly, help-seeking was 
measured primarily by examining attitudes to seeking help from medical professionals.  
It seems logical that participants who attribute the cause of depression to biomedical 
causes would seek medical help for a solution.  Other studies suggest that biological 
attribution also results in reduced self-efficacy and less motivation for self-initiated 
interventions (Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010).   Thus the authorsǯ conclusion that 
promoting biomedical explanations for depression is a positive strategy for public 
education, based on a single measure of help-seeking, appears flawed.   
Rusch, Kanter and Brondino (2009) examined the impact of causal information 
about depression on the effects of stigma-reduction video-messages.  Stigmatising 
attitudes and behavioural intentions to disclose the depression  were measured pre- 
and post-test and at one-week and one-month follow-up.  Participants were randomised 
to either of the two experimental conditions ȋǲcontextualǳ versus ǲbiologicalǳ causes) or 
either of an active control (programme containing no causal information) or non-active 
control (no programme).The contextual and control programmes both had a large effect 
on stigma-reduction.  The biomedical programme did not significantly reduce stigma.  
Having causal beliefs about depression which were congruent with the programme 
content significantly increased their effectiveness.   People in the contextual condition 
reported higher behavioural intentions than those who watched the biological or 
contextual programmes.   In line with theory (Meehl, 1973), findings from this study 
suggest that having an explanation (which is non-stigmatising) is important in 
disclosing depression to others and seeking social support.  Unfortunately this study did 
not explore willingness to seek professional help.   
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Deacon and Baird (2009) recruited psychology undergraduates at an American 
University.  Participants were presented with either a chemical-imbalance or a 
biopsychosocial explanation of depression.  Participants were asked to complete 
attitude questionnaires as if they had received a diagnosis of depression.   Participants 
were then given the alternative explanation for depression and the questionnaires were 
repeated.  The biochemical explanation was rated as the most credible and was 
associated with lower ratings of responsibility for the depression.  The biochemical 
explanation was also associated with significantly worse ratings of prognosis and 
psychotherapy-efficacy.   The biochemical explanation was associated with greater 
perceived effectiveness of medication whereas the biopsychosocial explanation was 
associated with greater effectiveness of self-initiated interventions.   All effect sizes 
were moderate to large. The authors conclude that the chemical-imbalance explanation 
for depression leads to less personal responsibility and blame but also leads to a worse 
expected prognosis and an expectation that psychosocial treatment will be largely 
ineffective.  Extrapolating these findings to a wider population needs to be done with 
caution.  The repeated measures design used in this study may have led participants to 
present more polarised views thereby increasing effect sizes.   
Professionals.  Ahn, Proctor and Flannagan (2009) conducted three studies with 
mental health professionals and trainees in America.   In study one, participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which each of 445 disorders were biological, psychological or 
environmental in nature.  A strong negative correlation was found between biological 
and psychological causal ratings, whereas there was a strong positive correlation 
between ratings of psychological and environmental causes.  Both psychologists and 
psychiatrists gave significantly higher ratings of biological causation across the 
disorders than social workers.  The pattern of correlations supported a continuum of 
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etiological beliefs from disorders viewed as primarily biological (e.g. autism) to 
disorders seen as primarily psychosocial (e.g. bulimia).  Depression fell in the middle of 
this spectrum and was rated as both moderately biological and psychosocial.  The 
second study replicated these findings in a sample of 63 registered clinicians.   
In their final study, Ahn et al.  examined the extent to which causal beliefs 
impacted cliniciansǯ judgements of treatment efficacy in conditions which had been 
rated as moderately biological.  Participants were given patient vignettes in which each 
patient was described as having a MI with a specific cause (e.g. depression caused by 
genetics).   Repeated-measures ANOVA found a significant interaction between cause-
type (biological vs. psychological) and treatment-type (medication vs.  therapy).  When 
participants were told the cause of depression was biological they rated medication as 
more effective than therapy,   whereas participants who were told the cause was 
psychological rated therapy as more effective.  The pattern of results was independent 
of profession.   The authors argue that a focus on causal explanations might blind 
clinicians to the benefit of different treatment approaches. 
 
Discussion 
a.) To what extend do the general public and professionals endorse 
biomedical/illness explanations as a cause of depression? 
 The studies reviewed suggest that lay causal beliefs about depression tend to 
reflect a psychosocial framework. Eight of 12 studies cited psychosocial causes as the 
most commonly endorsed explanations, including all four representative population 
surveys. Two longitudinal surveys found significant increases in biomedical beliefs over 
time in the UK (Paykel et al, 1998) and America (Pescosolido et al., 2010). Four small-
scale surveys found strong endorsement of biomedical beliefs. These studies had 
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unrepresentative samples (American psychology undergraduates). The contrasting 
findings may also represent more exposure to biomedical theories of depression in 
American culture (Hinshaw, 2006). Findings suggest that people from non-Western 
cultures are less likely to adopt biomedical explanations for depression (Wong et al, 
2010; Khasla et al. 2011). Seven of 10 studies, found people with experience of 
depression strongly endorse psychosocial causes. Biomedical causal beliefs were more 
common for people with severe depression (Budd et al., 2008; Meyer & Garcier-Roberts, 
2007). Three studies examined professional beliefs (Ahn et al., 2009; Ogden et al., 1999; 
Kuyken et al., 1992). These suggest that professionals put equal emphasis on both 
biomedical and psychosocial causes in depression.  
Limitations. Measurement reliability of causal beliefs varied across the studies. 
The majority of studies asked people to rate the likelihood of possible causes. Few 
studies asked participants to rank the relative importance of these causes. Although 
some studies utilised validated scales of aetiological beliefs many used self-designed 
scales which did not appear to encompass the full range of possible causal beliefs. Few 
potential moderating variables were measured across any of the studies. It would be 
helpful to understand how personal characteristics, contact with MI, and education 
levels influence causal beliefs.  
 
b.) Do biomedical causal beliefs impact attitudes towards treatment and help-
seeking? 
 The studies reviewed suggest that lay endorsement of biomedical beliefs leads to 
greater professional help-seeking (Paykel et al., 1998; Goldstein&Roselli,2003; Han et 
al., 2006; Wong et al., 2010); greater perceived effectiveness of medication (Kuyken, 
1992; Budd et al., 2008; Deacon & Baird, 2009), a preference for medical treatment 
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(France et al., 2007; Meyer & Garcia-Roberts, 2007; Schweizer et al., 2010)and less 
preference for talking therapies (France et al.,2007).  In contrast psychosocial beliefs 
were associated with a preference for psychotherapy (Meyer & Garcia-Roberts, 2007; 
Schweizer et al., 2010; Khasla et al., 2011) and greater perceived effectiveness of self-
initiated interventions (Goldstein & Roselli 2003; Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010). Ahn et al., 
(2009) found that giving professionalsǯ biomedical causal information leads to greater 
perceived effectiveness for medication and lower perceived effectiveness for 
psychotherapy. 
Limitations. The majority of these studies used correlational designs which 
cannot infer causality. None of the studies examined potential moderating variables.   ǲ(elp-seekingǳ in many of the studies was primarily measured by medical help-
seeking and did not explore willingness to seek psychological help or help from 
religious leaders, friends or family. Using medical help-seeking as a measure of self-
stigma, as was the case in many of the studies, did not seem valid.  
Only one study examined how service-usersǯ experience of treatment 
effectiveness impacted their causal explanations of the depression. In addition, it would 
have been interesting to explore how congruency between service-usersǯ explanations 
for depression and their treatment intervention impacted adherence, motivation, 
treatment effectiveness and experiences of the intervention. 
 
c.) Do biomedical/illness causal beliefs impact stigma?  
 The findings suggest that biomedical causal beliefs impact stigma. Biomedical 
beliefs were associated with less control over symptoms (Brown et al., 2007; Deacon & 
Baird, 2009), lower self-efficacy (Deacon & Baird, 2009), less willingness to disclose 
depression (Rusch et al., 2009), worse prognosis (Deacon & Baird, 2009), increased 
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desire for social distance (Jorm & Griffiths, 2008) and greater perceptions of 
dangerousness (Pescosolido et al., 2010). However, biomedical beliefs were also 
associated with less self-blame and responsibility (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Goldstein & 
Roselli, 2003). Longitudinal studies suggest that increases in biomedical beliefs were 
associated with no change in, or a worsening of, attitudes over time (Paykel et al., 1998; 
Pescosolido et al. 2010).  
  Limitations. None of these studies employed robust experimental designs so 
they cannot infer causation. Analyses were often limited by multiple comparisons 
without the use of a conservative p values meaning results at the p<.05 level need to be 
treated with caution. Some of the significant correlations were small and without effect 
sizes it is unclear how meaningful these findings are.   
Few of the studies explored the potential moderating effects of factors such as 
gender, age or the severity of the depression on aetiological explanations and stigma.  
Factors which may have moderated stigma, such as social contact, were also not 
explored.  In addition, the longitudinal studies which compared stigmatising attitudes 
over time did not account for generation effects. Thus the small changes in attitudes 
reported in these studies may be a result of changes in the cohorts being sampled.  
 
Limitations of the review 
There was a paucity of research examining a range of professional attitudes 
especially in the areas of stigma and judgements of treatment effectiveness. Where 
studies did explore professional attitudes, many did not explicitly state the professions 
which were sampled making it difficult to compare the effect of biomedical beliefs on 
attitudes and clinical judgements across professional groups.  Treating ǲprofessionalsǳ 
as a homogenous group may have masked variability in aetiological beliefs, clinical 
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judgements and stigma across the different professions which are involved in the 
treatment of people with depression. 
   A further limitation of the review was the lack of any qualitative studies. Only 
two thematic analytic studies were identified in the literature review (Gammell & 
Stoppard, 1999; Schreiber & Hartrick, 2002).  These examined Canadian womenǯs 
conceptualisations of depression as a medical illness. These studies were excluded to 
aid coherence of the literature review.  However, the lack of qualitative studies 
precluded the exploration of the personal narratives and discourse that surround the 
construct of depression as a medical illness.  
 
Implications for research and practice 
 
The review suggests that promoting biomedical causes of depression may reduce self-
blame at a cost of reduced self-efficacy and perceived control over symptoms.  Although, 
promoting biomedical beliefs encourages medical help-seeking, promoting biomedical 
models of depression may reduce preference and motivation for self-initiated and psychological treatments. Understanding clientsǯ causal beliefs may be helpful in 
exploring motivational issues and self-stigma when planning treatment.  Psycho-
education which emphasises biomedical predispositions may be incongruent with lay 
models of depression and counter-productive. Biomedical beliefs may also increase 
stigmatising attitudes to people with depression and lead to a desire for social distance.  
Overall, there is little evidence that biomedical models of depression are helpful 
in reducing stigma. However, in line with previous literature it does appear that having 
an explanation is important in increasing behavioural intentions such as willingness to 
disclose depression (Meehl, 1973). The findings suggest that psychosocial or contextual 
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explanations may be more acceptable and less stigmatising to the public than 
biomedical explanations.  
None of the studies in this review examined the impact of cliniciansǯ causal 
beliefs on stigma and only three studies examined clinicianǯs treatment preferences. These studies suggest that cliniciansǯ causal beliefs may lead to treatment preferences 
which could be incongruent with the evidence-base.  Further research is needed which 
examines the impact of causal beliefs on cliniciansǯ attitudes towards depression and 
treatment.  )n addition, it would be useful to explore whether cliniciansǯ causal beliefs 
affect stigmatising attitudes towards the client. This research would benefit from using 
a robust experimental design to allow for causal inferences to be made.   
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Abstract 
Aims. Biological explanations of depression have been found to increase professional 
perceptions of the effectiveness of medical treatments and reduce the perceptions of the 
effectiveness of psychological therapy. Studies in lay populations have shown that 
biological explanations reduce perceptions of self-efficacy and control over depression 
symptoms. There is a lack of research examining the impact of causal models on 
cliniciansǯ attitudes. The current study aimed to explore whether cliniciansǯ causal models of a clientǯs depression can be biased by aetiological labelling and, in turn, 
whether cliniciansǯ causal models impact clinical judgements and attitudes.   
Design. An experimental design was utilised, with one independent variable (labelling 
of the clientǯs depression) with three levels (biological, psychosocial and neutral). 
Outcomes measured causal beliefs, treatment effectiveness, control, clinical attitudes 
and perceived stigma in relation to a client vignette.  Observational data were analysed 
to explore the effects of cliniciansǯ primary causal models on the outcome variables.  
Methods. Over 200 trainee clinical psychologists, across England, Scotland and Wales, 
took part in an online survey, presented using surveymonkey®. Where appropriate data 
were analysed using ANOVA. 
Results. There was a small effect of the manipulation; labelling the depression as 
biological increased biological causal attributions and increased perceptions of the 
effectiveness of medical treatments. The exploratory analysis demonstrated substantial 
effects of strongly endorsing biological causal beliefs on judgements of medical 
treatments and client engagement. 
Conclusions. The results suggest that cliniciansǯ casual models of a clientǯs depression 
may bias clinical judgements. These findings are preliminary and further research is 
needed. 
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Introduction 
Causal models of depression 
A dichotomy has often been cited between biological and reactive types of 
depression (Beck and Alford, 2009). The former has been attributed primarily to 
biological causes, such as chemical imbalances and genetics, and the latter to 
psychosocial reactions to stressors, such as job loss or bereavement.  The validity of 
such a distinction has been questioned and it has been argued that it reflects an 
unscientific mind-body dualism (Pies, 2009).  
Following the advent of psychotropic drugs in the 1960s, there was a surge in 
biomedical explanations for depression, such as the serotonin-inactivity theory (Borup, 
Meidahl, Petersen & Yangtorp, 1982).  Increased scientific understanding in the ͳͻͻͲǯs, 
led to optimism for finding a neurological or genetic basis for depression (Jones & 
Mendall, 1999).  More than 20 years on, there is little evidence for a primary biomedical 
cause of depression (Double, 2004; Hasler, 2010; Hindmarch, 2001). In parallel, there 
has been an increase in psychological and psychosocial theories of depression, including 
models of: cognitive-mediation (Beck, 1964), stress-coping appraisal (Billings & Moos, 
1982), learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) and metacognitive processes (e.g. 
Sheppard, & Teasdale, 2000).  Psychosocial models have been criticised for a lack of 
empirical evidence as complete models of depression (e.g. Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; 
Hahner, 1989). Despite these criticisms there continues to be little integration between 
psychological and biological models of depression (Lam, Salkovskis & Warrick, 2005). 
In clinical practice the use of integrated biopsychosocial models have been 
encouraged to take into account the many causal variables in mental illnesses (Engel, 
1977).  However, biopsychosocial models have been criticised for reducing psychosocial 
factors to mere triggers of exaggerated genetic predispositions (Joseph, 2006; Read, 
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2005). Although many clinicians claim to endorse biopsychosocial models, experimental 
studies suggest that clinicians tend to attribute the primary cause of mental disorders to 
either biological or psychosocial causes (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). In addition, 
clinicians have been found to more strongly endorse biological causes of depression 
compared to the public (Kuyken, Brewin, Power & Furnham, 1992; Ogden et al., 1999).   
Biomedical models and diagnostic labelling  
 
The process of diagnosis is a key outcome of biomedical models of depression. 
The use of diagnostic labels has become a more prominent feature within mental health 
and psychological services (Boyle, 2007). The increase in diagnostically driven 
psychology services has led to authors arguing that psychological models of mental 
health problems are becoming increasingly biomedical and illness based (Read, 2005). 
In the face of the dominant medical discourse surrounding experiences of emotional 
distress within mental health services, there is much debate around the construct of 
depression and its diagnosis. Depression is the most commonly diagnosed mental 
health problem (World Health Organisation, 2008). It has been argued that such 
diagnostic labels are an efficient way to distinguish clients based on identifiable 
characteristics, thereby enabling inferences to be made regarding aetiology and the 
effectiveness of interventions (Corrigan & Penn, 1999). On the other hand, critics have 
proposed that there is an absence of any biological or physical markers for depression, 
making the diagnosis of a depressive illness confused and erroneous (Boyle, 1990; 
Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999). Such critics argue that depression is a scientifically invalid 
construct which enables an unhelpful process of labelling and medicalising human 
misery. 
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The role of causal explanations in treatment 
Despite the prevalence of the diagnosis of depression, around 50% of people in 
developed countries do not receive any treatment.  A leading cause of not seeking help 
is social stigma (WHO, 2008).   Holding an explanation for depression has been 
associated with reduced stigma and increased help-seeking (Rusch, Kanter and 
Brondino, 2009).  Meehl (1973) proposed that having causal explanations for 
experiences such as depression is important in judgements of normality – ǲthe understanding it makes it normal effect.ǳ  Kim and LoSavio ȋʹͲͲͲȌ, found that people 
judged mental illnesses to be more common and more normal if coherent causal 
explanations were given.  
Identifying causal and maintaining factors is a key part of clinical formulations, 
and is used to predict treatment effectiveness (Sloman, 2005).  Yopchick & Kim (2009) 
found that clinicians judge treatments to be more effective if they are perceived to act 
on initial causes rather than symptoms.  
Biological versus psychosocial causal explanations 
 Biological and psychosocial causal models may have inadvertent consequences 
on attitudes and behaviour.  Attribution research (Weiner, 1983; 1985; 1995) has found 
that perceiving negative events as uncontrollable reduces personal responsibility and 
maintains self-esteem (Weiner, 1983).  In depression, it has been proposed that 
biological causes, such as genetics, are viewed as less under the individualǯs control, 
thereby reducing blame and encouraging help-seeking (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Paykel et 
al., 1998).  This idea has led to the promotion of depression as a biological illness in a 
bid to reduce stigma and encourage help-seeking in depression (e.g. ǲDefeat Depression,ǳ ͳͻͻʹ-1996, Paykel et al., 1998).  The results of these campaigns have been 
mixed.  Biological explanations have been associated with reduced perceptions of blame 
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(Brown et al., 2007; Deacon & Baird, 2009) and increased professional help-seeking 
(Goldstein & Roselli, 2003; Paykel et al., 1998).  Biological explanations have also been 
associated with reduced motivation for psychological therapy, lower self-efficacy and a 
worse expected prognosis compared to psychosocial explanations (Deacon & Baird, 
2009; France et al. 2007; Schweizer et al., 2010).  These consequences can be explained 
by attribution research if biological causes of depression are perceived to be more 
stable than psychosocial causes. In experimental studies, Weiner (1995) found negative 
events attributed to a stable cause can reduce self-esteem, self-efficacy and motivation.   
The consequences of labelling depression as a biological illness may also have 
important consequences for stigma. Goffmanǯs ȋͳͻ͸͵Ȍ seminal work, explored the 
concept of stigma as a social process in which an individual is labelled with an attribute 
which is discrediting and shameful.  In the context of depression stigma may occur 
when the person is labelled as being ǲillǳ and is perceived to be different from the norm.  
Causal explanations and clinical judgements  
The process of labelling depression as biomedical or psychosocial involves 
subjective value judgements by those who hold the power to make clinical decisions. In 
addition, wider systemic factors impact upon decision making in a complex process 
with multiple individual, organisational, social and political influences. For example, 
within the NHS there is an increasing use of mental health clustering based largely on 
medical diagnosis coinciding with economic pressures and payment by results. Thus in 
considering the impact of aetiological labelling on clinical judgements these wider 
systemic factors need to be borne in mind.  
Research into clinical decision-making has found that cliniciansǯ causal models 
are strong predictors of treatment strategies (Witteman & Keole, 1999). Furthermore, experimental studies have shown that clinicianǯs own causal beliefs can lead to a bias in 
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clinical decision-making in which clinicians ignore client-specific data.  
(DeKwaadsteiniet, Hagmayer, Krol & Witteman, 2010).  Research has shown that 
incongruence between treatment interventions and clientǯs causal beliefs can lead to 
worse outcomes and reduced motivation for treatment (Cottraux, Messy, Marks, 
Mollard, & Bouvard, 1993; Lax, Basoglu and Marks, 1992).    
Clinical studies have shown that professionals who strongly endorse biological 
causal explanations are more likely to advocate pharmacotherapy, hospitalisation and 
ECT (Read & Harre, 2001) and to view the client as more pathological (Kent & Read, 
1998).  Conversely, Miresco and Kirmayer (2006) found that clinicians feel clients are more responsible, and to blame, for ǲpsychologicalǳ symptoms compared to ǲbiologicalǳ 
symptoms.   
There is a paucity of research examining the impact of professionalsǯ causal 
explanations on clinical judgements in depression.  In a search of the literature, only 
two relevant studies were found.  Kukyen, Brewin, Power & Furham (1992) found that 
stronger biomedical causal beliefs among clinical psychologists, relative to the public, 
were associated with greater perceived effectiveness of medication.  In an experimental 
study, Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan (2009) demonstrated that clinical psychologistsǯ 
judgements can be biased by causal information.  Giving clinicians a biological causal explanation for a clientǯs depression ȋe.g. geneticsȌ   increased ratings of effectiveness 
for medication and reduced ratings of effectiveness for psychological therapy.  
The finding that cliniciansǯ causal models can bias treatment decisions is of 
particular significance given the prominent role evidence-based guidance in clinical 
practice. The National )nstitute of Clinical Excellenceǯs guidelines for depression 
promote a stepped-care model of treatment, from active-waiting and guided self-help to 
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high-intensity interventions such as Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), 
Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) and anti-depressants  (NICE, 2009).   
The NICE guidance for depression states:  ǲDo not routinely vary the treatment strategies for depression described in this 
guideline either by depression subtype or by personal characteristics as there is 
no convincing evidence to support such action ȋN)CE, ʹͲͲͻ, p.ʹͺȌǳ 
The Present Study 
The present study examines: a) whether clinical psychology traineesǯ causal beliefs can 
be modified through the presentation of a clientǯs depression as being ǲbiologicalǳ or ǲpsychosocial,ǳ bȌ if any modification in causal beliefs affects clinical judgements and 
attitudes, and c) whether cliniciansǯ primary causal beliefs about the depression bias 
clinical judgements and attitudes.  ǲCliniciansǳ, in the context of this study, refers to trainee clinical psychologists. 
Previous research suggests that clinical psychologists are as likely to be biased by 
aetiological information in judging the effectiveness of treatments for depression as 
medical doctors or social workers (Ahn et al., 2009). Investigating the effect of causal 
labelling on clinical judgements is of particular interest within clinical psychology due 
to the central role of formulation in clinical practice. Clinical psychologists often draw 
upon multiple theoretical models in formulating the causal and maintaining factors in a clientǯs distress and use these formulations to plan treatment.  If causal attributions affect cliniciansǯ preferences and optimism for treatment, understanding this will be 
important in considering the role of cliniciansǯ causal explanations in clinical practice. 
For example, will a clinician who perceives the cause of depression to be more 
biological perceive psychological therapy to be less effective? Ultimately, cliniciansǯ 
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judgements and optimism for treatment are likely to affect the client relationship and 
treatment outcomes. Also of significance, is whether causal bias can lead clinicians to 
make judgements which are not justified by the best available evidence.   
Hypotheses 
Clinical psychology trainees presented with a client vignette in which symptoms 
are proposed to be typical of a ǲbiological depressionǳ relative to trainees presented with a vignette in which symptoms are proposed to be typical of a ǲpsychosocial depressionǳ will: ͳ.Ȍ Be more likely to attribute the cause of the clientsǯ depression to biological factors. 
2.) Be more likely to advocate medical treatment for the depression and be less likely to 
advocate psychological or self-initiated therapies.  
3.) View the client as being less self-efficacious and the depression as being less 
controllable.  
4.) Demonstrate more negative attitudes towards the depression and more pessimistic 
attitudes towards treating the client psychologically. 
5.) Have different perceptions of the likelihood of the client experiencing stigma. 
Method  
Design 
  The study implemented an experimental design, with one independent variable 
(aetiology) with three levels: biological, psychosocial and neutral (control). Participants 
were randomly allocated to conditions and were blind to the manipulation.  
Questionnaire data was collected on six outcomes: causal beliefs, treatment 
effectiveness, control, self-efficacy, perceived stigma, and cliniciansǯ attitudes. Data was 
analysed using SPSS version 20. 
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Participants 
Power analysis was conducted using g*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). To demonstrate a medium effect (d= 0.5), in a one-tailed test (p= .05), at 1–Ⱦ= 
0.86, a minimum of 41 participants were needed per group. To allow for data to be 
analysed non-parametrically, this calculation was multiplied by 1.05 to give a minimum 
sample size of N= 129 (Clark-Carter, 1997). Participants were sampled from the 
population of trainee clinical psychologists. This large accessible population enabled the 
use of a randomised control design and robust statistical analysis.  The approximate 
population at the time of recruitment was N= 1,500 (estimated using information from 
the Clearing House for Postgraduate Courses in Clinical Psychology, 2011).  
Twenty-five of the 30 course centres agreed to circulate the recruitment request 
and 309 trainees consented to participate.  Trainees from the authorǯs cohort were 
excluded. Ninety-two participants either did not start the survey or chose to exit before 
completion and were assumed to have withdrawn consent; 70.2% completed the survey 
(n= 217).  Participants were aged 21-43; the majority (86%) were women reflecting the 
underlying population (in 2011, 81% accepted onto clinical training were women).  See 
Table 1.  for demographic information.  
Materials  
Vignette.  Participants were presented with a description of Ǯclient Dǯ the 
information presented met the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for major depression 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The depression would most appropriately be described as ǲmild.ǳ  Mild depression refers to depression which causes ǲmild functional 
impairmentǳ and has ǲfew, if any symptoms… in excess of the five required to make the 
diagnosisǳǳ ȋN)CE, ʹͲͲͻ, p.͸ʹȌ.  The experimental manipulation was contained within the vignette and the symptoms were described as ǲtypical of…ǳ either ǲa biological 
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depressionǳ or ǲa psychosocial depression.ǳ )n the control condition no inferred 
aetiology was presented (see appendix D, p.110).  
Survey tool. The online survey tool “SurveyMonkey®ǳ was used to present the 
survey (see appendix E, p.112). Where appropriate, the presentation of the measures 
was randomised. The survey toolǯs prize draw function was utilised. 
Questionnaires.  
The modified survey of etiological beliefs and treatment effectiveness.  
The survey consisted of two Likert scales: a 17-item, five-point, (1= definitely not a 
cause, 5= definitely a cause) measure of causal beliefs, and a 12-item, seven-point (1= 
definitely ineffective) to (7= definitely effective) measure of treatment effectiveness 
(Niewsu & Pepper 2010). The questionnaire was adapted from Goldstein & Roselliǯs 
(2003) original, by adding three items to the survey of etiological beliefs: ǲbiochemical abnormalities,ǳ ǲrecent misfortunesǳ and ǲdisease in the brain.ǳ  A principal component 
analysis on the data revealed a two components model; psychosocial factors (11-items, 
accounting for 20% of the variance) and biological (6-items, accounting for 19% of the 
variance).  In the current study, scale reliability was acceptable to high (biological, Ƚ=  
0.87; psychosocial, Ƚ=  0.66). Responses on the treatment effectiveness scale were 
divided into medical treatments (ECT, hospitalisation and anti-depressants, Ƚ=  0.57), 
psychological treatments (psychotherapy, cognitive therapy and behavioural therapy, Ƚ=  0.67), self-medication (alcohol and recreational drugs, Ƚ=  0.79) and self-initiated 
treatments (exercise, relaxation/yoga, self-help, and getting out more, Ƚ=  0.73).  
  Clinicians’ attitude questionnaire - modified. An adapted version of the 
Clinicians Attitude Questionnaire (CAQ; Lam & Salkovskis, 2007) and General Attitude 
Questionnaire (Lam, Salkovskis & Warwick, 2005) was used.  The modified 
questionnaire incorporated five items from the CAQ and four items from the GAQ. 
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Participants were asked to imagine they or a psychologist in their service was treating 
the client, and rate their responses to items such as ǲhow likely do you feel the client would be to harm themselves?ǳ on a Ͳ-100% visual-analogue scale (transformed to a 1-ͳͳ scale for analysisȌ from ǲnot at allǳ to ǲdefinitely.ǳ The original version of the CAQ 
had good test-retest reliability (r= 0.82).  
A principal component analysis was conducted on the items used in this study 
(see appendix F, 121). Four components with eigenvalues greater than one were 
extracted, these accounted for 64.56% of the variance. The four factors were: ǲtreatment success,ǳ combined from two items ȋcurability and treatment effectiveness, 
loadings>.͹Ȍ, ǲengagement,ǳ combined from three items ȋmotivation, drop-out and relapse, loadings>.ͷ͹Ȍ  ǲseverity,ǳ combined from two items ȋǲlevel of disabilityǳ and ǲintensity of treatment needed,ǳ loadings>.͹Ȍ, and ǲriskǳ combined from two itemsȋǲlikelihood to harm selfǳ and ǲneed for hospitalisationǳ ȋloadings>.Ͷ͹Ȍ. 
Perception of depression questionnaire (PDIQ), self-efficacy subscale.  The 
24-item self-efficacy subscale (PDIQ) was used as a measure of participantsǯ beliefs about the clientǯs control over the depression (Manber et al. 2003). The scale asks participantǯs to rate, along a four-point, Likert scale (1= Not at all, 4= very much so) how 
much the client would be able to use self-initiated strategies to control their depression 
(e.g. ǲmaking changes in their lifeǳ).  The self-efficacy subscale has demonstrated good internal consistency ȋȽ= 0.91) and 8 week test-retest reliability (r= .83).  Internal 
consistency in the current study was also high ȋȽ= .92). 
Illness perception questionnaire modified for depression (IPQ), control-cure 
subscale. The six-item control-cure subscale (Fortune, Barrowclough & Lobban, 2004) 
was adapted from the Illness Perception Questionnaire (Weinman et al., 1996). The scale measures participantǯs beliefs about the ability to control or cure the depression, 
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along a five-point Likert scale, (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree). Scale reliability 
was Ƚ= 0.56, and test-retest reliability was, r= .68 (Fortune et al, 2004).  In the current 
study, reliability was also low ȋȽ= 0.54). The control subscale was higher ȋȽ= 0.62) and 
was used in the analysis.   
 Stigma Scale.  The 25-item, five-point Likert scale, comprises five subscales 
(Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010). The ǲauthoritarianismǳ and ǲdiscriminationǳ scales were 
developed using Couture and Pennǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ review of the stigma literature. ǲDangerousnessǳ ǲdependencyǳ and ǲaffectivityǳ scales were created based on research 
by Angermeyer and Matschinger (2003). The stigma scale demonstrated high internal consistency ȋȽ= 0.9; subscales, Ƚ= 0.62-0.89, Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010).  The scale has 
convergent validity and correlates with the Internalised Stigma of Mental Illness 
Alienation Scale (Ritsher, Otilingam, & Grajales; r= 0.46, p<.01). In the current study the 
Stigma Scale and subscales demonstrated high internal consistency ȋȽ= .72-.93). 
Procedure and ethics 
Ethical approval was granted by the Salomons Ethics Panel at Canterbury Christ 
Church (appendix G, p.122). Two recruitment drives were carried out in February and 
June 2012, when all clinical psychology programmes on the Clearing House Website 
were contacted via email and/or phone.  Recruitment emails (see appendix H-I, pp.123-
124) were forwarded to clinical psychology trainees by course centres.  
Participants were randomised to a condition and presented with the vignette. 
Participants then completed the study measures. Participants were able to register for a 
prize-draw (prizes of four vouchers worth up to £50). Registration details could not be 
linked to the data. The prize-draw was completed following data-collection and 
participants were notified of prizes via email. A full debrief and summary was emailed 
to participants following study completion (appendix J, p.126).  
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Results 
Analyses  
Analysis was conducted in two stages.  Firstly, in-line with hypothesis one, the 
experimental data was analysed to see if the manipulation had an effect on causal 
beliefs. Potential moderator variables were then explored prior to testing the 
experimental hypotheses. The second section of the results presents the observational 
analysis. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 6.  Main findings are discussed in the 
text. 
Treatment of the Data 
Normality was assessed by calculating skew and kurtosis values for all scales 
(see appendix K, p.123). Four scales were found to have significant levels of kurtosis and/or skew ȋvaluesη +/-3; Kline, 2000). Examination of histograms indicated one 
extreme outliner in responses to the psychotherapy scale which was removed, 
correcting the distribution. A log transformation was conducted on the psychotherapy, 
risk and engagement scales correcting for kurtosis.  Pearsonǯs r was used to explore 
correlations between scales (all r’s(217)<.50; see appendix L, p.130). 
Where assumptions were met all data were analysed parametrically, using 
ANOVAs. Where hypotheses were made, Post hoc Tukey tests were used to make 
comparisons.  Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons were used for single item analysis and 
for all exploratory analysis. Non-parametric data were analysed using Kruskal-Wallis 
(CI = 99%) and follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests.   
Effect sizes are given using Pearsonǯs r (small= .1, medium= .3, large= .5) and Cohenǯs d (small=  0.2, medium=  0.5, large=  0.8; Cohen, 1992). Effect sizes for ANOVA are given using ηp2 (small= .01, medium= .06, large= .14, Kinnear & Gray, 2010).   
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Motivation Check 
Motivation levels were tested by asking participants to identify symptoms which 
had occurred in the vignette (maximum correct= 8). There appeared to be high 
motivation across the sample (M=  6.77, SD= 1.25).  
Experimental Groups  
Differences across groups were analysed using X2 tests for categorical variables 
and ANOVA for continuous variables. Withdrawal from the study did not vary across 
conditions, X2(2, N= 92)= .93, p= .65.   The number of depression symptoms identified 
from the vignette varied across conditions, F(2,217)= 3.99, ηp2<.02, p<.02.  Participants 
in the control condition identified more symptoms (M= 7.15, SD= 1.25) than either the 
biological group (M= 6.62, SD= 1.26, p<.05) or the psychosocial group (M= 6.62, SD= 
1.25, p<.05).  This was a small effect suggesting differential motivation across groups 
was not a concern. 
There were no significant differences across conditions in terms of 
demographics, year of training or the number of people who identified as having a 
theoretical orientation.  Nor were there any significant differences in participantsǯ 
underlying causal beliefs about mental illness (see Table 1 and 2).  
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Table 1. 
Demographic details and group differences (X2) 
 
 
 
All Biological 
Psychosoci
al 
Neutral 
X2 df 
n  n  n  n  
Sample                                       217 
(100) 
 
85 
(39) 
 
71 
(33) 
 
61 
(28) 
   
Gender          0.87 2 
 Male 31 
(14) 
 
14 
(16) 
 
8 
(11) 
 
9 
(15) 
   
 Female 186 
(86) 
 
71 
(84) 
 
63 
(89) 
 
52 
(85) 
   
Year of training          3.48 4 
 1 66 
(30) 
 
21 
(25) 
 
26 
(37) 
 
19 
(31) 
   
 2 80 
(37) 
 
34 
(40) 
 
26 
(37) 
 
20 
(33) 
   
 3 71 
(33) 
 
30 
(35) 
 
19 
(27) 
 
22 
(36) 
   
Ethnicity          21.30 22 
 White 
British 
164 
(76) 
 
63 
(74) 
 
53 
(75) 
 
48 
(79) 
   
 White 
other 
30 
(14) 
 
9 
(11) 
 
13 
(18) 
 
8 
(13) 
   
 Black 
British 
2 
(1) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
0 
(0) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
 Black other 4 
(2) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
2 
(3) 
   
 Asian 4 
(2) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
2 
(3) 
   
 Mixed race 7 
(3) 
 
4 
(1) 
 
2 
(3) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
 Not stated 6 
(3) 
 
4 
(5) 
 
1 
(1) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
Identified 
theoretical 
orientation 
 
        6.60 4 
  Yes 53 
(24) 
 
24 
(28) 
 
15 
(21) 
 
14 
(23) 
  
 
 Note. Percentages are given in parentheses.  Cumulative percentages may not add up to 
100% due to rounding. 
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Table 2. 
 
Group differences (ANOVA)  
 
Instrument  All 
(Mean) 
Biological 
(Mean) 
Psychosocial 
(Mean) 
Neutral 
(Mean) 
F df 
 Age 
28.48 
(3.60) 
28.45 
(3.60) 
28.45 
(4.00) 
28.57  
(3.13) 
0.26 2,214 
Causal beliefs 
about mental 
illness   - SEB                 
 
      
 Biological  2.54 
(1.01) 
2.55 
(0.96) 
2.58 
(1.00) 
2.49 
(1.11) 
1.20 2,214 
 Psychological 3.6 
(0.89) 
3.65  
(0.89) 
3.52 
(0.89) 
3.75 
(0.87) 
1.22 2,214 
 Environmenta
l 
3.74 
(0.86) 
3.74 
(0.94) 
3.65 
(0.85) 
3.84 
(0.76) 
0.78 2,214 
Note.  SEB= Survey of Etiological Beliefs, M= Mean, Standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses below means. 
 
Outcome of the Experimental Manipulation 
There was a non-significant trend in the predicted direction, with a small effect 
of group on biological causal ratings (p<.09). The between group differences did not 
reach significance, although participants in the biological condition gave higher ratings 
of biological causality than participants in the psychosocial group (d= 0.28, p= .19) or 
control group (d= 0.33, p= .13). There was no difference between the psychosocial and 
control group (d<0.05, p= .97).   
Due to the divergence of causal factors making up the biological (e.g. chemical 
imbalance vs. brain disease) and psychosocial scales (e.g. negative life events vs. will 
power) analysis was conducted on individual items.  There was a small effect of group on ratings of ǲbiological factorsǳ (p<.01). Participants in the biological condition rated biological factors as more likely to be causal in the clientsǯ depression than participants 
in the psychosocial condition (d= 0.49, p<.01).   
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There was a small effect of group on ratings of ǲgeneral stress,ǳ (p= .02) and 
ǲresponse to a negative life event,ǳ (p= .03). Participants in the biological condition were 
less likely to rate the depression as being caused by general stress (d= 0.42, p= .02) 
compared to people in the psychosocial condition. There was a trend towards people in 
the biological group viewing a negative life event as being less likely to be causal in the 
depression, relative to the psychosocial group (d= 0.34, p= .078) or the neutral group 
(d= 0.38, p= .08).   
There were no significant between-groups effects on any other scale items, 
F’s(2,214)= 0.5-2.1, p>.20, ηp2<.02, P<0.45. 
Potential moderators.  ANOVAǯs were conducted to test for moderators of the 
effect of group x causal beliefs. Potential moderators were proposed to be: participantǯs 
underlying beliefs about mental illness, gender, year of training and whether or not 
participants identified as having a theoretical orientation. There were no significant 
interactions (see appendix M for a description of this analysis, p.130). 
Summary. The findings suggest that the experimental manipulation had a small effect on causal beliefs about the clientǯs depression.  Framing the depression as ǲtypical 
of a biological depressionǳ slightly increased ratings of biological causality; however the 
difference between conditions did not reach significance.   Analysis of individual items 
showed significant variability in causal ratings across groups.  In line with the 
hypothesis, reading the biological vignette increased participantǯs causal ratings of 
biological factors, and reduced causal ratings of stress and negative life events.  The 
effect was not moderated by participantsǯ gender, year of training, identification with a 
theoretical orientation or their underlying causal beliefs about mental illness.  
This bias in causal attributions only occurred in the biological condition; there was no effect of framing the clientǯs symptoms as ǲtypical of a psychosocial depression.ǳ  
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Figure 1. highlights the similarity in causal ratings across the psychosocial and control 
group.  In contrast, there were large differences between the biological and psychosocial 
groups. For example, 47% of the biological group agreed that biological factors were likely to be a leading cause of the clientǯs depression, compared to ʹ͵% of the 
psychosocial group.  In turn, 41% of the biological group felt negative life events were a 
leading cause of the depression compared to 61% of the psychosocial group.  A notable 
exception was for ratings of psychological factors.  
  
 
Figure 1.  
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Graph showing the percentage of people, across groups, who believed each cause was leading in the clientǯs depression. 
Note. Only the three most popular biological and psychosocial causes are represented 
 
Experimental Hypotheses 
Treatment effectiveness.  Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. There was a 
small effect of group on perceived effectiveness of medical treatments (p= .03).  
Participants in the biological group were more likely to endorse medical treatments 
than the neutral group (d= 0.43, p= .03). Participants in the biological group also rated 
medical treatments as more effective than participants in the psychosocial group. 
However, this difference did not reach significance (d= 0.30, p= .13.).  The effect of group on ǲanti-depressants,ǳ ǲECTǳ and ǲhospitalisationǳ were 
analysed separately.  There was no effect of group on perceived effectiveness of anti-
depressants, F(2,214)= 0.76, p= .49, P= .18.  Agreement that anti-depressants would be 
effective was high across conditions (η92%). 
There was a marginal effect of group on hospitalisation, F(2,214)= 2.95, p= .055, ηp2= .03, P= 0.60, with people in the biological group rating hospitalisation as more 
effective than those in the neutral group (d= 0.37, p= .053).  There was no significant 
difference between the biological and psychosocial group (d= 0.22, p= .47).   
There was a non-significant trend towards an effect of group on ratings of 
effectiveness for ECT, h(2)= 4.85, p= .09, CI= .08-1.00. Mann-Whitney follow-up tests 
indicated this trend was in the predicted direction. Trainees in the biological condition 
rated ECT as more effective (mdn= ʹ, moderately ineffectiveȌ in treating the clientǯs 
depression than those in the psychosocial group (mdn= 1, definitely ineffective), U= 
2572, z= -1.75, p= .08, r= -.14, or the neutral group (mdn= 1), U= 2155, z= -1.92, p<.06, 
r= -.16. There was no difference between the psychosocial and neutral group (U= 2572, 
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z= -.24, p= .81).  Survey responses indicated that 37% of the biological group rated ECT 
as possibly effective, compared to 27% of the psychosocial group and 25% of the 
control group. 
In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no significant effect of group on 
perceived effectiveness of ǲpsychological therapy,ǳ F(2,213)= 0.48, p= .62, P= 0.13. 
Average ratings for psychological therapy were in the moderately effective range, with 
100% of participants agreeing that psychological therapy would be (at least) possibly 
effective in treating the clientǯs depression ȋsee Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.  
66 
 
 
 
Graph showing the percentage of people, across groups, who perceived each treatment to be effective in treating the clientǯs depression. * ǲNot sure/possiblyǳ ratings were collapsed into the effective category 
 
Table 3. 
 Between-groups effects (ANOVA results) 
Instrument  
(Range) 
Biological 
x  
Psychosocial 
x  
Neutral 
x  
F df ηp2 β 
SEB 
(1-5) 
Overall biological 2.89 
(0.69) 
 
2.70 
(0.66) 
 
2.67 
(0.64) 
2.40 ᵻ 2,214 .02 0.48 
Overall psychosocial 3.18 
(0.42) 
 3.26 
(0.35) 
 3.31 
(0.34) 
2.47 2,214 .02 0.44 
 ǲBiological factorsǳ  3.32a 
(0.82) 
 2.93b 
(0.76) 
 3.07ab 
(0.80) 
4.97** 2,214 .04 0.80 
 ǲStressǳ 3.60 a 
(0.68) 
 3.89b 
(0.69) 
 3.79ab 
(0.67) 
3.80* 2,214 .03 0.64 
 ǲNegative life eventǳ 3.32 
(0.89) 
 3.59 
(0.69) 
 3.61 
(0.59) 
3.47* 2,214 .03 0.08 
STE 
(1-7) 
Medical 3.16a 
(0.89) 
 2.89b 
(0.91) 
 2.80b 
(0.80) 
3.61* 2,214 .03 0.66 
 Psychological therapy 6.01 
(0.67) 
 
 
6.01 
(0.71) 
 
 
5.90 
(0.71) 
0.48 2,213 <.01 0.13 
Self-medication 1.49 
(0.95) 
 1.46 
(0.80) 
 1.52 
(0.89) 
0.93 2,214 <.01 0.60 
 
Self-initiated 
5.49 
(0.73) 
 
5.42 
(0.55) 
 
5.47 
(0.62) 
0.91 2,214 <.01 0.77 
PDQ 
(1-4) 
Self-efficacy  2.73 
(0.44) 
 
2.71 
(0.41) 
 
2.69 
(0.44) 
0.43 2,214 <.01 0.07 
IPQ-D 
(1-6) 
Control-cure 4.23 
(0.56) 
 4.21 
(0.45) 
 4.21 
(0.43) 
0.35 2,214 <.01 0.06 
Control 4.29 
(0.49) 
 4.25 
(0.55) 
 4.28 
(0.53) 
0.11 2,214 <.01 0.07 
Stigma  
(1-5) 
Global 3.19 
(0.62) 
 3.23 
(0.41) 
 3.10 
(0.64) 
0.91 2,214 <.01 0.21 
Authoritarian 3.30 
(0.67) 
 3.43 
(0.47) 
 3.18 
(0.70) 
2.85 2,214 .03 0.55 
 Discrimination 3.29 
(0.83) 
 3.32 
(0.69) 
 3.17 
(0.86) 
0.57 2,214 <.01 0.14 
 Dangerousness 2.39 
(0.65) 
 2.34 
(0.58) 
 2.31 
 (0.66) 
0.27 2,214 <.01 0.09 
Affectivity 3.52 
(0.71) 
 3.59 
(0.47) 
 3.48 
(0.71) 
0.44 2,214 <.01 0.12 
 Dependency 3.53 
(0.90) 
 3.33 
(0.81) 
 3.25 
(0.91) 
1.97 2,214 .02 0.40 
CAQ-M 
(1-11) 
Treatment effectiveness  8.23 
(1.26) 
 8.35 
(1.25) 
 
 
8.21 
(1.10) 
2.63 2,214 <.01 0.09 
 Engagement 6.91 
(1.27) 
 7.05 
(1.25) 
 6.94 
(1.13) 
0.55 2,214 <.01 0.14 
 Perceived risk 2.70 
(1.38) 
 2.68 
(1.19) 
 2.99 
(1.26) 
1.49 2,214 .02 0.32 
 Severity 3.21 
(1.25) 
 3.98 
(1.23) 
 3.13 
(1.20) 
2.07 2,214 .01 0.42 
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Note.    Standard deviations are given in parentheses under means. SEB= Survey of 
Etiological Beliefs; STE=  Survey of Treatment Effectiveness; PDQ= Perceptions of 
Depression Questionnaire; IPQ-D= Illness Perceptions Questionnaire–Depression, CAQ-
M=  Clinicians Attitude Questionnaire-Modified. 
* pζ.Ͳͷ,**p ζ.Ͳͳ, # pζ0.8, means with differing subscripts are significantly different at 
pζ.Ͳͷ. 
. 
Control.  There was no effect of group on measures of control or self-efficacy 
(p’sη.ͻͲȌ.   Thus the hypothesis, that people in the biological group would see the 
depression as less controllable was not supported.  The majority of participants 98-
100% ǲagreedǳ the depression could be controlled and perceived the client to be ǲsomewhatǳ able to demonstrate self-efficacy in managing the depression.  
Clinicians’ attitudes. The hypothesis that trainees in the biological condition 
would hold more pessimistic attitudes than participants in the psychosocial condition was not supported. There were no significant effects of group on ratings of ǲtreatment effectiveness,ǳ ǲengagement,ǳ ǲseverityǳ or ǲriskǳ (all p’s>.13).  Across conditions risk 
and severity were rated low, engagement was rated moderately and the likelihood of 
treatment being effective was perceived to be high. 
Stigma.  Overall, the hypothesis that condition would affect judgements of 
perceived stigma was not supported. There was no effect of group on measures of ǲoverall stigma,ǳ ǲdangerousness,ǳ ǲdependency,ǳ or ǲdiscriminationǳ ȋall p’sη.14). There 
was a marginal effect of group on ǲauthoritarianǳ stigma (p= .058). Participants in the 
psychosocial group were more likely to perceive others as holding authoritarian 
attitudes to the client than participants in the neutral group (d= 0.42, p<.05).  There was 
no significant difference between the biological and psychosocial group (d= 0.23, p>.10). 
  The majority of participants, across conditions, felt the client was at risk of 
experiencing most types of stigma (60%-90%). The only exception to this was stigma 
related to perceptions of dangerousness (8%).  The data suggests that participants in 
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the psychosocial condition were more likely to feel the client would experience stigma, 
compared to the biological condition (9% difference).  A notable exception was ǲdependency,ǳ with ͳͲ% more people in the biological condition believing the client 
would be seen as needy and dependent.  The lowest stigma ratings, across all scales, 
were given by participants in the neutral condition (see Figure 9, appendix N, p.132), 
Observational Findings  
Causal beliefs about the depression.  Participants were divided into one of 
four groups based on their ratings on the SEB: those who scored higher than the mean on the biological scale ȋηʹ.ͺͶ; ǲbiologicalǳȌ, those who scored higher than the mean on the psychosocial scale ȋη͵.ʹͲ; ǲpsychosocialǳȌ, those who scored higher than the mean on both scales ȋǲbiopsychosocialǳȌ and those who scored lower than the mean on both scales ȋǲlow causalǳȌ. The resulting groups reflected participantsǯ primary causal beliefs about the clientsǯ depression.  
Group differences. There were no significant differences across groups in terms 
of the experimental group they had been allocated to (p= .47) or in the test of 
motivation, F(3,213)= 0.31, np2= .01, p= .82, P= 0.11. Nor were there any significant 
differences across groups in gender, year of training or ethnicity (p’sη.ͳͳȌ. There was a 
significant difference across groups in the number of people who identified with a 
theoretical orientation (p<.02). Group frequencies indicated that participants with 
strong biological beliefs were less likely to identify with a theoretical orientation (13% 
vs. 25-33%). There was a significant effect of group on age, with people with ǲlow causalǳ beliefs being on average two years older than people in the psychosocial group 
(std. error= .67, p<.02). 
There was a significant effect of group on endorsement of psychological, environmental and biological factors as important causes of mental illness ȋall pǯsζ.05). 
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Post hoc tests indicated that causal beliefs about mental illness were congruent with 
participantsǯ causal attributions about the clientǯs depression ȋSee table ͷȌ.   
 
Table 4 
 Group differences: Aetiological beliefs about the clientǯs depression ȋX2) 
 All Biological Psychosoci
al 
Biopsychosoci
al 
Low 
causal 
X2 df 
n  n  n  n  n   
Sample 
                                       
217 
(100)  
56 
(26)  
59 
(27)  
49 
(23)  
53 
(24)    
Condition            5.57 6 
 Biological 85 
(39) 
 
26 
(31) 
 
19 
(22) 
 
19 
(22) 
 
21 
(25) 
   
 Psychosoci
al 
71 
(33) 
 
20 
(28) 
 
21 
(30) 
 
13 
(18) 
 
17 
(24) 
   
 Control 61 
(28) 
 
10 
(16) 
 
19 
(31) 
 
17 
(19) 
 
15 
(25) 
   
Gender            1.41 3 
 Male 31 
(14) 
 
6 
(11) 
 
10 
(17) 
 
6 
(12) 
 
9 
(17) 
   
 Female 186 
(86) 
 
50 
(89) 
 
49 
(83) 
 
43 
(88) 
 
44 
(83) 
   
Year of 
training 
 
          10.43 6 
 1 66 
(30) 
 
23 
(41) 
 
14 
(24) 
 
17 
(35) 
 
12 
(23) 
   
 2 80 
(37) 
 
20 
(36) 
 
23 
(29) 
 
20 
(41) 
 
17 
(32) 
   
 3 72 
(33) 
 
13 
(23) 
 
22 
(37) 
 
12 
(25) 
 
24 
(45) 
   
Ethnic 
origin 
 
          26.50 33 
 White 
British 
164 
(76) 
 
40 
(71) 
 
47 
(80) 
 
35 
(71) 
 
42 
(79) 
   
 White other 30 
(14) 
 
11 
(20) 
 
4 
(7) 
 
9 
(18) 
 
6 
(11) 
   
 Black 
British 
2 
(1) 
 
0 
(0) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
0 
(0) 
   
 Black other 
(2)  
0 
(0) 
 
2 
(3) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
 Asian 4 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
 Mixed race 7 
(3) 
 
2 
(4) 
 
3 
(5) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
   
 Not stated 6 
(3) 
 
2 
(4) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
1 
(2) 
 
2 
(4) 
   
Identify 
with a 
theoretical 
orientatio
n 
 
          15.42* 6 
  Yes 53 
(24) 
 
7 
(13) 
 
17 
(29) 
 
16 
(33) 
 
13 
(25) 
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 Note.  Cumulative Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding, percentages 
are given in parentheses. 
 *pζ.Ͳͷ 
 
 
Table 5. 
 Group differences: Aetiological beliefs about the clientǯs depression ȋANOVAȌ 
Note.  SEB=  Survey of Etiological Beliefs, standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses below means, means with differing subscripts are significantly different at pζ.Ͳͷ. 
*pζ.05, ** p ζ.01  
 
Main Effects of Causal Beliefs 
Treatment effectiveness.  There was a large effect of causal beliefs on perceived effectiveness of ǲmedical treatments,ǳ ȋp<.001). Participants in the biological 
group were more likely to endorse medical treatments than the psychosocial group (d= 
1.12, p>.ͲͲͳȌ and the ǲlow causalǳ group ȋd= 0.63, p<.001).  Participants in the 
biopsychosocial group also rated medical treatments to be more effective than the 
psychosocial group (d= 0.99, p<.ͲͲͲͳȌ and the ǲlow causalǳ group ȋd= 0.54, p= .02).  
There was a large effect of group on ratings of effectiveness for ǲanti-depressantsǳ ȋp<.001).  Participants in the psychosocial group perceived anti-
depressants to be less effective than participants in the biological group (d= 1.13, 
Instrument 
(Range) 
Item 
All Biological 
Psychosoci
al 
Biopsychosoci
al 
Low 
causal 
F 
  Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
                          Age 
 
27.81 
(2.89) 
 
28.17 
(3.50) 
 
28.14 
(3.18) 
 
29.90 
(4.41) 
3.71** 
SEB - beliefs 
about 
mental 
illness  
 
         
 Biological  2.54 
(1.01
) 
2.89ac 
(0.91) 
 
2.12bcd 
(1.04) 
 
2.82abc 
(1.07) 
 
2.40bd 
(0.84) 
7.93** 
 Psychological 3.65 
(0.89
) 
3.55ab 
(0.87) 
 
3.90a 
(0.80) 
 
3.67ab 
(0.97) 
 
3.45b 
(0.87) 
2.72* 
 Environmenta
l 
3.74 
(0.86
) 
3.57a 
(0.83) 
 
4.00b 
(0.79) 
 
3.65ab 
(0.93) 
 
3.70ab 
(0.87) 
2.77* 
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p<.001), biopsychosocial group (d= 0.68 p= .ͲͲͳȌ or ǲlow causalǳ group ȋd= 0.46, p= 
.058).  
There was a medium effect of group on ǲhospitalisation,ǳ ȋp<.01).  Those in the 
psychosocial group perceived hospitalisation to be less effective in treating the clients 
depression than the biological group (d= 0.67, p<.02) and the biopsychosocial group (d= 
0.58, p= .02).  
There was a medium effect of group on ECT, h(3)= 15.5, p<.001, CI<0.00-0.01. 
The ratings of effectiveness for ECT were significantly higher in the biological group 
(mdn= 2; moderately ineffective) compared to the psychosocial group (mdn= 1; 
definitely ineffective), U= 1120; z= -3.35, p<0.01, r= -.͵ͳ, and the ǲlow causalǳ group 
(mdn= 1), U= 1112; z= -2.52, p= 0.01, r= -.24.   
Ratings of effectiveness for ECT in the biopsychosocial group were also 
significantly higher than the psychosocial group (mdn= 2), U= 946.5; z=  -3.46, p<.01, r= 
-.͵͵, and the ǲlow causalǳ group U= 936.5; z= -2.70, p<.01, r= -.27. 
There were no significant differences between the biological and biopsychosocial 
group U= 1292; z= -.552, p= .ͷͺ, or between the ǲlow causalǳ group and the psychosocial 
group U= 1496.5; z= -.486, p= .63, on effectiveness ratings for ECT.   
Overall, 87% of the psychosocial group and 76% of the low causal group rated 
ECT as ineffective compared to 57% of the biological group and 53% of the 
biopsychosocial group.   
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
  
Between-group effects: Causal beliefs about the clientǯs depression 
Instrument 
(Range) 
Biologica
l 
Psychosocia
l 
Biopsychosoci
al 
Low 
causal 
Statistic ηp2 β 
x  x  x  x  F df  
STE 
(1-7) 
 
   
   
 
  
 Medical 3.34a 
(0.84) 
2.50b 
(0.64) 
3.29a 
(0.93) 
2.81b 
(0.84) 
13.61** 3,213 .16 1.00 
 Anti-
depressants 
5.59a 
(0.73) 
4.51b 
(1.14) 
5.27 a 
(1.08) 
5.00 a 
(1.00) 
12.00** 3,213 .15 1.00 
 Hospitalisation 2.00a 
(0.89) 
1.42b 
(0.83) 
2.00a 
(1.14) 
1.60b 
(0.97) 
4.45** 3,213 .06 0.87 
 Psychological  
therapy 
6.00 
(0.69) 
6.04 
(0.61) 
6.06 
(0.74) 
5.83 
(0.73) 
1.23 3,212 .02 0.13 
 Self-medication 1.32 
(0.61) 
1.33 
(0.61) 
1.77 
(1.18) 
1.58 
(0.99) 
2.67* 3,213 .04 0.65 
 Self-initiated 5.56 
(0.55) 
5.51 
(0.69) 
5.48 
(0.81) 
5.27 
(0.67) 
1.84 3,213 .03 0.47 
PDQ           
(1-4) Self-efficacy  2.70a 
(0.39) 
2.78a 
(0.41) 
2.85a 
(0.45) 
2.55b 
(0.42) 
4.61** 3,213 .06 0.89 
IPQ-D           
(1-5) Control 4.33 
(0.48) 
4.33 
(0.44) 
4.36 
(0.56) 
4.09 
(0.67) 
2.92* 3,213 .04 0.69 
Stigma            
(1-5) Global 3.17 
(0.54) 
3.24 
(0.52) 
3.25 
(0.51) 
3.05 
(0.69) 
1.46 3,213 .02 0.38 
 Authoritarian 3.32 
(0.68) 
3.38 
(0.54) 
3.38 
(0.52) 
3.17 
(0.72) 
1.46 3,213 .02 0.38 
 Discrimination 3.23 
(0.75) 
3.35 
(0.73) 
3.40 
(0.73) 
3.09 
(0.94) 
1.55 3,213 .02 0.14 
 Dangerousness 2.38 
(0.55) 
2.40 
(0.69) 
2.40 
(0.66) 
2.21 
(0.61) 
1.09 3,213 .02 0.29 
 Affective 3.53 
(0.62) 
3.55 
(0.56) 
3.61 
(0.56) 
3.43 
(0.79) 
0.68 3,213 .01 0.19 
 Dependency 3.25 
(0.86) 
3.56 
(0.75) 
3.40 
(0.93) 
3.33 
(0.98) 
1.29 3,213 .02 0.34 
CAQ-
M 
 
   
      
(1-11) Treatment 
effectiveness 
8.12  
(1.31) 
8.36 
(1.29) 
8.41 
(1.10) 
8.18 
(1.10) 
1.38 3,213 .01 0.69 
 Engagement 6.67a 
(1.18) 
7.34b 
(1.28) 
7.06ab  
(1.09) 
6.78ab 
(1.21) 
3.62** 3,213 .05 0.79 
 Perceived risk 2.94 
(1.25) 
2.49 
(1.12) 
3.07 
(1.71) 
2.63 
(0.97) 
3.08 3,213 .03 0.72 
73 
 
 
 
 Severity 4.49 
(1.06) 
4.58 
(1.15) 
4.67 
(0.78) 
4.30 
(0.95) 
1.60 3,213 .02 0.42 
Note.  Standard deviations are given in parentheses under means,  STE=  Survey of Treatment 
Effectiveness; PDQ =  Perceptions of Depression Questionnaire; IPQ-D=  Illness Perceptions 
Questionnaire – Depression; CAQ-M =  Clinicians Attitude Questionnaire-Modified, means with differing subscripts are significantly different at pζ.Ͳͷ. 
* p ζ.Ͳͷ, **pζ.Ͳͳ,  
There were no significant effects of group on ǲself-initiated interventionsǳ (p= 
.14). Nor were there any between-group effect on ratings of ǲpsychological therapy,ǳ ȋp= 
.30). As can be seen from Figure 3, there was a ceiling effect for psychological therapy 
with all participants, across groups, rating it in the effective range.   
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participantǯs whose ratings for each treatment fell in the effective range. 
Note  
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* ǲNot sure/possiblyǳ ratings were included in the effective range. 
 
Control.  There was a medium effect of group on control (p<.01). There was a 
non-significant trend towards participants in the low causal group rating the depression 
as less controllable compared to the biopsychosocial group, d= .47, p= .07. Participants 
in the low causal group also rated the depression as less controllable than participants 
in the psychosocial group (d= 0.42) and the biological group  (d= 0.41),  although these 
differences did not reach significance (p>.11).   
A small effect of group on self-efficacy was also found (p<.05). Participants with ǲlow causalǳ beliefs rated the client as having less self-efficacy than participants in the 
biopsychosocial group (d= .69, p= .002), and marginally less than the psychosocial 
group (d= 0.55, p= .062). There was no significant difference between the biological 
group and the low causal group (d= 0.37, p= .34). 
These findings suggest that holding a causal model of the clientǯs depression is 
important in perceiving that the depression can be controlled.  In addition, strongly endorsing psychosocial causesǯ either alone or as part of a ǲbiopsychosocial modelǳ 
increases perceptions that the client is able to implement strategies to manage their 
depression (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  
Percentage of participants rating the depression as highly controllable (*ratings >4) and 
the client as highly able to demonstrate self-efficacy over the depression (*ratings>2.5).  
 
Clinicians’ attitudes. There was a medium effect of causal beliefs on ratings of client ǲengagement,ǳ (p= .014).  The psychosocial group rated engagement as 
significantly higher than the biological group (d= 0.54, p= .018).  There was a trend 
towards participants in the psychosocial group having higher ratings of engagement 
than the low causal group (d= 0.45, p= .086).   Fifty-six per cent of participants with high 
psychosocial beliefs rated client engagement in therapy as high, compared to 45% of 
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people with strong biopsychosocial beliefs, 36% of people with strong biological beliefs 
and 36% of people with low causal beliefs (see figure 5). 
 
 
Figure  5.  Percentage of participantǯs rating the clientǯs motivation as high ȋ>͸Ͳ%Ȍ. 
 There was a marginal effect of group on ǲriskǳ (p= .058). Participants with strong 
psychosocial beliefs perceived the client to be less risky than those in the 
biopsychosocial group (d= 0.40, p= .14) or the biological group (d= 0.38, p= .14).  These 
were small effects which did not reach significance. Overall, risk was rated as low 
(<20%).  See figure 6 for a break-down of risk ratings as function of causal beliefs. 
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There was no significant effect of group on ǲtreatment effectiveness,ǳ or ǲseverityǳ ȋp’sη.19).  Perceptions of treatment effectiveness were high across the sample 
(ratings>70%) and severity of the depression was moderately low (ratings<40%). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  
The percentage of participants across groups who rated the client as being a risk (ratingsη10%). 
 
Stigma.  There was no effect of participants causal beliefs about the clientǯs 
depression on measures of ǲoverall stigma,ǳ ǲdangerousness,ǳ ǲdiscrimination,ǳ  ǲdependency,ǳ ǲaffective stigmaǳ or ǲauthoritarianǳ stigma (all p’s≥.20).  
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Discussion  
In line with previous experimental findings (Ahn et al., 2009), the data suggests that 
trainee clinical psychologistǯs causal beliefs were biased by presenting the depression as 
biological. This effect was small and only evident on the most endorsed causes. The 
effect is of note, given the very subtle nature of the manipulation. The clientǯs 
depression was not stated to be caused by biological factors, rather it was framed as ǲtypical of biological depression,ǳ and the vignettes described identical symptoms.  Despite this, trainees who read that the depression was ǲtypical of a biological depressionǳ felt the depression was more likely to be caused by biological factors and 
less likely to be caused by stress or negative life events.  Although this assertion may 
seem logical, there is an absence of evidence for a biological-psychosocial distinction in 
depression (Pies, 2009; Hasler, 2010). 
Presenting the depression as biological was also found to increase traineesǯ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of medical treatments.  This is consistent with previous 
findings (Kuyken et al. 1992; Ahn et al., 2009). The effect of the current study was small. 
Further research is warranted to examine whether the effect of framing depression as 
biological is amplified in real-life settings. This is of clinical significance, as referrals, and 
clients themselves, may state that the depression is biological, especially when 
recurrent or if there is a family history.  If clinicians can be biased by this information it 
may lead them to advocate for medical treatments when this is not indicated by client 
information or NICE guidance (2009).  In contrast to Ahn et al. (2009), this study did not 
find an effect of presenting the depression as biological on the perceived effectiveness of 
psychological therapy. Psychological interventions were rated as highly effective across 
all conditions suggesting there may have been a ceiling effect, which would be 
unsurprising given the professional training of the sample used. 
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There was no effect of framing the depression as psychosocial on causal beliefs 
or treatment effectiveness and the reason for this is unclear. Psychosocial causal factors 
were more strongly endorsed than biological factors across the sample, thus the 
manipulation may have had less room to have an effect.  It is also possible that ǲbiological depressionǳ was felt to be a more credible subtype of depression compared 
to psychosocial depression and therefore had more influence on causal beliefs.  
In contrast to previous findings in lay populations, this study found no effect of 
framing the depression as biological on perceptions of self-efficacy or control (Goldstein 
& Roselli, 2003; Brown et al., 2007, Deacon & Baird, 2009).  Clinicians may be less likely 
to see biological causes of depression as untreatable or uncontrollable, compared to 
non-professionals.  
Perceptions of stigma towards the client were rated to be high, across conditions, 
suggesting that stigma in depression is a significant concern.  Labelling the depression 
as psychosocial led clinicians to feel the client would be more likely to experience 
authoritarian stigma, such as others perceiving them to be incompetent.   Agreement 
that the client would experience stigma (overall), was also higher in the psychosocial 
condition. Previous findings have been mixed, some studies have found that 
psychosocial explanations for depression increase stigma (Goldstein & Roselli, 2003) 
whereas other studies have shown no effect (Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010) or the reverse 
(Kent & Read, 1998).  Perceptions of stigma were the lowest in the neutral group 
suggesting that additional labelling of the depression as biological or psychosocial 
increased stigmatising attitudes. This is in contrast to previous research which suggests 
causal explanations reduce judgements of stigma (Rusch et al., 2009; Kim & LoSavio, 
2000). Further research is needed to see if these are significant and reliable effects.  
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Exploratory analysis of the data found that trainees were heavily biased by their 
own causal models of the depression. There were large effects of endorsing primarily 
biological (or biopsychosocial) models on perceived effectiveness of medical 
treatments.  Participants who had strong biological causal beliefs felt anti-depressants, 
ECT, and hospitalisation would be more effective in treating the depression than people 
whose beliefs reflected a primarily psychosocial model.  Thus traineesǯ judgements of 
treatment effectiveness, for the same client, varied in relation to their own causal 
models.  Causal attributions for the depression appeared to be congruent with trainees 
causal beliefs about mental illness as a whole.  Further research would be helpful to 
understand how clinicians make these judgements, in real-life settings. This could 
explore the extent to which clinicians apply their own causal models to understanding and formulating clientǯs distress and to what extent they use client data to create case 
specific models. 
The finding that trainees who felt the depression was more likely to have 
biological causality were more likely to advocate anti-depressants, ECT and 
hospitalisation, may seem logical. However, there is no evidence to support this 
assertion (NICE, 2009).  In fact, in the case of mild depression, the guidelines state, anti-
depressants and medical treatments should not be considered due to a poor risk-benefit 
ratio.  Of course, ratings of treatment effectiveness do not equate to actual endorsement 
or recommendation of medical treatments in clinical settings. Yet it seems feasible that 
clinicians who perceive anti-depressants to be more effective may be more likely to 
recommend them or support their use, even if not indicated by the evidence.  Previous, 
studies have found this to be the case amongst medical professionals (Read & Harre, 
2001).  Future studies could test this hypothesis in relation to clinical psychologists. 
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There was no effect of causal beliefs on perceived effectiveness of psychological 
therapy.  This suggests that trainees feel therapy is still effective even if the depression 
is seen to have biological causes.   However, trainees who had high biological ratings felt 
the client would be less motivated and engaged in psychological therapy. In addition, 
there was some support that people who endorsed biological models perceived the 
client to be more risky, in terms of self-harm and need to be hospitalised.  Previous, 
research has demonstrated that holding biological causal models can also lead 
professionals to have more blaming and authoritarian attitudes towards clients (Kent & 
Read, 1998; Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006). 
 It is unclear why biological models led to more pessimism about client 
engagement in therapy.  It would be interesting to explore the impact of cliniciansǯ 
casual beliefs on attitudes to real-life clients and whether clinical judgements impact the 
therapeutic relationship.  Previous research has suggested that incongruence between cliniciansǯ and clientsǯ causal models of mental illness can lead to worse adherence and 
outcomes in therapy (Cottraux et al., 1993; Lax et al., 1992).   Understanding how cliniciansǯ models and client beliefs interact in therapy would be an interesting avenue 
for further research.  Previous research suggests that biological explanations of 
depression can reduce service-users self-efficacy and hope for recovery, (Brown et al. 
2007).  If clinicians who hold strong biological models of mental illness are more likely 
to convey medical illness explanations to the client, in attempt to normalise symptoms, 
this may have inadvertent negative consequences for the client. 
A tentative finding from this study was that trainees who did not strongly 
endorse either psychosocial or biological causal beliefs had lower perceptions of 
control, self-efficacy, and client engagement. Previous research has shown that not 
having a coherent causal explanation for emotional distress leads to reduced 
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perceptions of treatment effectiveness (Yopchick & Kim, 2009).  A problem in making 
any inference from the current study is that the effect may be due to a bias in scoring, 
with participants in this group having a tendency to rate all measures in the lower 
range.  One indication that this may not explain the whole effect is that there were no 
significant differences, across causal beliefs, in the check of motivation. If not having 
causal explanations has a reliable effect on clinical judgements this will be a significant 
finding and as such it warrants further research. 
Limitations. There were a number of limitations of the current study. Firstly, the 
sample used trainee clinical psychologists and it is not clear if the findings would 
generalise to the wider population of qualified clinicians. Clinicians involved in the care 
of clients with depression routinely come from many different professional 
backgrounds such as nurses, psychotherapists, counselling psychologists, social 
workers and medical doctors. The use of clinical psychology trainees did not allow for 
comparisons to be made about the effect of aetiological labelling on clinical judgements 
across professional groups. This omission was primarily due to the large number of 
participants which this would have necessitated. 
A second limitation, relates to the nature of the vignettes used. These adhered to 
the DSM diagnostic criteria for depression and clearly labelled the clientǯs experiences as ǲdepression.ǳ Thus the vignettes utilised diagnostic and medicalised language which may have primed participants towards an illness conceptualisation of the clientǯs 
experiences. The use of diagnostic and medical language is common within mental 
health services. However, it would have been interesting to investigate whether a non-diagnostic presentation of the clientǯs experiences would have interacted with the 
effects of aetiological labelling on cliniciansǯ judgements. In addition, the use of 
vignettes does not enable the inference that the effects of causal beliefs on clinical 
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judgements would hold in real-life clinical settings. Clinical vignettes are widely used in 
research and do have validity; clinicians often receive written referral information 
about clients. Furthermore, the effect of heuristics and biases in clinical-decision 
making may actually be amplified in clinical settings due to time pressures.   
A final consideration is the nature of the questionnaires used. These were reliant 
on self-report measures of attitudes rather than intentions or actual behaviour. The 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour is unlikely to be straight-forward. In 
addition, although conservative measures were adopted, the use of multiple 
comparisons means that caution needs to be taken in interpreting effects which were 
small or marginal.  
Conclusion  
This study offers preliminary support that holding biological causal models of 
depression can bias judgements of treatment effectiveness and client engagement, 
leading trainees to more strongly endorse medical treatments such anti-depressants 
and ECT, even though they are unlikely to be indicated by the evidence-base or client 
data.  The effect sizes were substantive and warrant further confirmatory studies. 
The experimental findings also suggested that labelling depression as biological 
can bias clinicians towards endorsing biological causal beliefs and medical treatments. 
This was a small effect but given the subtlety of the manipulation used in the study it 
seems worthy of further investigation.  
 There is a lack of research in the area of causal explanations and clinical 
judgements.  The findings from this study can best seen as preliminary; further research 
would be valuable to set the findings in a more comprehensive context. 
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What research skills have you learnt and developed from undertaking this 
project. What do you need to develop further?  
Prior to clinical training I worked in purely clinical roles. As such I have not conducted 
research since my undergraduate degree, eight years ago.  I was daunted by the major 
research project and the level of skill and knowledge it necessitated.  One area of 
research I did feel confident in was critical appraisal.  I think I was able to use and 
develop this skill in planning and developing my research idea.   
I think the steepest learning curve for me was the recognition of how much time it took 
to plan and develop a research idea. I had little knowledge of the research process in 
practice and have a learnt a lot from doing this project. In hindsight, I think greater use 
of a systematic and time managed approach would have been beneficial. I think 
balancing multiple course, research, placement and home-life demands, as well looking 
for employment was exceptionally challenging and overwhelming at times. Although I 
hope never to have to balance so many competing demands again, I do feel I have a 
better appreciation of how to structure and plan research and could develop these skills 
further in clinical practice.  
I think a key area of learning for me was the importance of a thorough literature search. 
I think initially my literature searching was somewhat haphazard and I found it difficult 
to funnel the process. I feel there was an element of pressure to get started with data 
collection prior to completing a thorough literature search. I definitely feel, over the 
course of the project, I significantly developed my literature reviewing skills. I think it 
would be useful to develop this skill further, so when I do research in the future it is 
well-founded in a research context prior to embarking on the project.  I now have a 
better understanding of the crucial role of the literature search in the research process. 
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The biggest area of development for me was definitely in the advancement of my 
statistical knowledge. I have always had somewhat of an anxiety around statistics.  I 
think this in part relates to my specific learning difficulties and in part to my 
undergraduate struggle with statistics. On reflection, it has made me query why I took 
on such a complicated quantitative project.  Of course I was interested in the research 
and a quantitative analysis seemed the most appropriate research method. I also feel 
there was an element of me pushing and challenging myself to overcome my anxiety.  
Grappling with SPSS has definitely been challenging and time-consuming, particularly in 
the absence of research supervisors with quantitative expertise.  I feel I have to some 
extent overcome my statistics demons, but I would like to develop these skills further. 
In particular, I feel I would like to gain knowledge of different types of analysis, such as 
multiple regression, and how to apply them to different research designs and questions.  
The knowledge I have developed will definitely be helpful in understanding and 
critiquing published quantitative research in the future. 
A new experience for me was working with and collaborating with an external 
supervisor. This is something I have enjoyed and would like to have the opportunity to 
do in the future. I found the process supportive and have developed skills integrating 
and negotiating different perspectives and feedback in my work. I feel this experience 
will definitely be beneficial for when I do joint-working in the future. 
 
If you were able to do this project again what would you do differently and why? 
In a general sense, I would have tried to be more systematic and managed by time 
better. I feel I am someone who works well under pressure; however I think I 
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underestimated the amount of time the literature review, data-analysis, and reporting 
of the results would take. I think I also underestimated the impact of my dyslexia on the 
speed of my written work and my difficulties in concise writing and proof-reading. I 
think if I were to do the project again I would have afforded myself more time for these 
things. 
I would definitely have spent more time exploring the literature prior to embarking on the study. The original idea for my study was based on my supervisorsǯ unpublished 
study within a similar area, but related to anxiety. I realised quite late in the day that there was very little published research in the specific area of professionalsǯ causal 
beliefs and clinical judgements in depression. I think if I had more time it would have 
been interesting to more thoroughly explore the clinical-decision making research and 
critical psychology literature,  although this would have been beyond the scope of the 
written work.  
Ideally, if I were to do this project again I would have sought more guidance and 
support with the data analysis. I have queried whether ANOVA was the most 
appropriate method for the exploratory analysis or whether regression analysis would have been better to examine the relationships between cliniciansǯ causal beliefs and 
clinical judgements. I am very grateful for the support from the statistician at 
Canterbury Christ Church University, with some of the SPSS analysis. However, some 
more general guidance with regard to the design and analysis would have been 
valuable. 
If I were to do this project again, ) would have liked to explore clinicianǯs perceptions of the clientǯs blame and responsibility for the depression, as this is something that was 
highlighted in the literature (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006). I also wonder if the perceived 
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stigma of others was the most appropriate measure of stigma or whether  direct 
measures would have been more appropriate. However, using direct measures of 
stigma would need to overcome problems of social desirability.  
I think a greater use of measures of hypothetical behavioural intentions would have 
added some validity to the hypothesis that causal bias, in judgements of treatment 
effectiveness and engagement, are likely to have real-life implications. For instance, these could have asked ǲif you were to treat the client how likely would you be to use ȋas examplesȌ: ǲmedication-support,ǳ ǲillness models of normalisationǳ, ǲrecommend a psychiatric review/ CPNǳ or ǲgive the client between-sessions homework?ǳ  Developing 
such a measure would have raised issues of validity and reliability, which would have 
needed to be overcome. 
Finally, I would have spent more time exploring whether there are well-validated and 
established measures of cliniciansǯ attitudes and therapy optimism available for use 
rather than relying on an amalgamation of two scales, which was likely to reduce the 
scaleǯs validity.  It may be that these scales are simply not available. 
 
As a consequence of doing this study would you do anything differently in regard 
to clinical practice, or make clinical recommendations?  If so, why? 
I think this study has highlighted to me that how we frame emotional distress can have 
unexpected consequences.  There is evidence that lay theories of emotional distress 
tend to reflect a psychosocial framework and that incongruence between clinician and 
client models may lead to worse outcomes and adherence for therapy (Cottraux, Messy, 
Marks, Mollard, & Bouvard, 1993; Lax, Basoglu and Marks, 1992). In addition, research 
96 
 
 
 
suggests that biomedical models of depression have been associated with less control 
over symptoms, lower self-efficacy and worse expected prognosis (Deacon & Baird, 
2009; Nieuwsma & Pepper, 2010). As such, I think I will be far more cautious in using 
any illness analogies as a form of normalisation or psycho-education.  I think it has also 
highlighted to me that I, and other clinicians, make judgements which are biased by our 
own beliefs about causality, and that this may lead us ignore client-specific data and/or 
the evidence-base.  Although I feel clinical intuition is a useful clinical tool, I think 
clinicians need to remain reflective and be aware and explicit about their own causal 
models and potential biases. I think clinicians need to remain vigilant in considering 
clients in a person-centred, individual way, marrying this information with the clinicianǯs expertise and the current evidence-based best practice. 
This study has also emphasised to me the importance of clientsǯ own causal models. I 
think in clinical situations it may be helpful to explore clientsǯ causal models and 
develop these with the client to from a non-stigmatising and empowering part of the clientsǯ formulation.  
I think more generally it has highlighted the possible impact of labels, explanations, 
psycho-education and diagnosis. I think it has challenged me to be more critically aware 
of these issues. 
 
If you were to undertake further research in this area what would that research 
project seek to answer and how would you go about it? 
There appears to be very little research in the area of clinical-decision making and the 
impact of causal models on clinical judgements. As such there are many valuable 
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avenues for further research. Future studies could examine the extent to which causal 
models impact clinical-decision making in the light of other influences such as client-
specific data (e.g. gender, recurrence of difficulties, specific symptoms/experiences,  age 
etc.), evidence-based guidance, theoretical orientations and other potential moderating 
variables.  A qualitative approach may be valuable due to the exploratory nature of such 
research. Clinical psychologists could be interviewed to explore their causal models and 
clinical judgements in relation to different client vignettes. Semi-structured interview 
techniques could be used to gain a comprehensive picture of how clinicians form client-
specific causal models and the information that is important in making clinical 
judgements and planning treatments. I feel a grounded theory approach would be 
appropriate to develop a model of this process, which could then be tested through 
further quantitative studies. 
 A further interesting area of exploratory research would be to explore how 
clientsǯ and cliniciansǯ causal models interact in practice. Some previous research 
suggests that clinicians put more emphasis on biomedical causes than clients and that 
this can lead to different treatment preferences (Kuyken, Brewin, Power & Furnham, 
1992). In turn, studies suggest that incongruence between treatment interventions and 
causal models can reduce motivation for treatment (Meyer & Garcia-Roberts, 2007).  A study could examine the clientǯs and clinicianǯs model of the clientǯs depression in 
practice and how congruency in models impacts treatment outcomes (such as success, 
drop-out, client satisfaction and acceptability).  Such a study could implement a pre-
post design collecting outcomes on reasons for depression, motivation for treatment 
and symptomology (pre- and post-treatment) and collect client and clinician feedback 
98 
 
 
 
on therapy process post-treatment. The data could be analysed using regression 
analysis to see if congruence does impact these treatment variables. 
 A number of predictions from my study would also warrant further testing. For 
example, the findings suggested that not holding causal model of the depression 
reduced perceptions of control over the depression and client self-efficacy. It is possible 
that this was a product of the measurement rather than a real effect. It would be 
interesting to examine this in a study which overcomes the scoring issues, either by 
using reverse-scored items or by using different types of measurement. 
  It would also be useful to replicate the exploratory analysis conducted in order to 
conduct planned comparisons and specific predictions as part of a robust research design. This research could explore cliniciansǯ client-specific causal models of 
depression (using a vignette) without any experimental manipulation. The study could 
aim to overcome many of the limitations of the current study by using measures of 
blame and responsibility and more comprehensive, and client–specific, measures of cliniciansǯ stigma and attitudes. Furthermore, this research could explore hypothetical 
behavioural intentions such as proposed treatments, number of sessions, specific 
strategiesǯ, likelihood of step-up or step-down referrals, and so on. 
  More generally, this study has made me interested in critical psychology ideas 
and specifically the impact and relevance of diagnostic labelling. I would be interested 
to explore these ideas further.  
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A. Search Methodology 
 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Peer-reviewed studies were included if they measured biomedical causal beliefs, 
and/or illness beliefs, about depression. Studies which only described depressive symptoms, mood disorders or generic ǲmental illnessǳ were excluded.  Studies were 
included that examined public, service-users or professional attitudes.  ǲProfessionalsǳ 
included people involved in the provision of treatments for, or management of, 
depression with relevant postgraduate qualifications such as psychotherapists, clinical 
psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers or trainees in a relevant profession.  
Studies which exclusively sampled from non-professional staff groups such as support 
workers were excluded from the review. Only English language articles were included.   
Search Strategy 
Searches were conducted (up to 2012) on the five electronic databases using the 
following key words:  
ǲmental disordersǯǯ OR ǲmental illnessǯǯ OR ǲdepressionǯǯ OR ǲdepressive disorderǳ AND ǲattitudesǯǯ OR ǲstigmaǳ OR ǲtreatment preferencesǯǯ OR ǲillness beliefsǯǯ OR ǲillness attributionsǯǯ OR ǲcausal beliefsǳ OR ǲbiological beliefsǳ OR ǲmedical beliefsǳ OR ǲpsychological beliefsǳ OR ǲpsychosocial beliefsǯǯ 
Search terms were ǲauto-explodedǳ where possible, to include synonyms and other 
relevant terms. Search results were filtered based on the inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
Further studies were found by cross-checking reference lists for relevant articles. 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  
Search Flowchart 
B. Description of Studies 
Twenty-four relevant studies were identified:  population surveys (n= 9), 
observational/small-scale surveys (n= 11), and quasi-/experimental studies (n= 4).  The 
studies reviewed were predominantly based in America (n= 11), but also included 
studies from: the UK (n= 5), Canada (n= 1),   Australia (n= 2), Taiwan (n= 1), Holland 
(n= 1), Sweden (n= 1), Switzerland (n= 1) and Ireland (n= 1). Populations sampled 
included lay (n= 10); depressed service users (n= 9), professionals (n= 1) and mixed (n= 
2).  
Irrelevant articles 
removed from 
search lists by 
examining title  
405 articles removed from search lists 
by examining abstract based on 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
Articles scrutinised using 
inclusion/exclusion criteria 
32 articles removed (2 
qualitative articles) 
n= 454 
articles 
     n= 49 
n= >1,000 studies  
Databases searched 
using keywords 
     n= 24 
7 relevant studies 
found through 
cross-checking 
references 
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Authors N Design/ 
Analysis 
Inclusion  
criteria/ sample 
Constructs 
measured 
Measures Most 
common 
EBs 
BM 
beliefs 
(% of 
sample)  
Biomedical ABs 
associated with 
negative attitudes 
to depression? 
ABs: Impact on 
treatment and 
help-seeking  
 
Ahn et al.   
(2009) 
Study 1: 
P= 
30/CP=  
30/SW= 
29; 
Age/f= 
NR 
Study 2: 
P=16/CP
=25/SW= 
22; Age=  μ= 52.4 
f= 29 
Study 3: 
P= 8/CP= 
16/SW= 
20 
Ageμ= 54 
f= 22 
Survey/Quasi-
experimental 
(New Haven/ 
America) 
 
ANOVA 
NA ABs 
TE 
NA-author 
designed 
PS/BM NA NA  BM associated 
with higher belief 
in medication 
effectiveness** 
and lower belief 
in therapy 
effectiveness** 
 
Brown et al.  
(2007) 
191 
f= 135 
Age= μ=  
45.1 
Survey 
(Pittsburgh, 
USA) 
 
Regression 
Analysis 
a.Ȍ ηͳͺ years 
b.)current research 
participants  
c.)Receiving  
anti-depressant 
treatment  
ABs 
Control 
Consequences 
Duration 
Functioning 
Coping 
Illness 
Perception 
Questionnaire 
(Weinman, 
1996) 
SF6 health 
scale (Ware et 
al., 1994) 
The MOS 
health survey 
(Stewart et al., 
1988). 
Brief COPE 
(Carver, 1997). 
PS 
 
NR Yes – Less control 
over symptoms of 
D (r=  .17*) 
 
Yes – Greater 
severity of 
consequences (r= 
.24*) 
 
NA 
Budd et al.  
(2008) 
194 
f= 108 
Age=  μ= 
45 
Survey (Wales) 
 
Regression 
Analysis 
a.) Members of the 
Depression Alliance 
Cymru (Support 
group) 
 
 
 
ABǯS 
TE 
 
NA- Author 
designed 
 
 
PS/BM NR NA  
 
Chemical-imbalance 
associated with 
greater TE for 
medication (r= .2**) 
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Deacon & 
Baird 
(2009) 
90 
F= 88.9% 
Age= 18-
29 
( μ= 20.9) 
Quasi-
experimental 
(Wyoming, 
America) 
 
t-tests 
a.) Enrolled in 
abnormal 
psychology classes 
ABs 
Self-stigma 
Credibility  
Public stigma 
Prognosis 
TE 
Perceptions of 
depression 
questionnaire 
(PDQ; Deacon 
& Baird, 2009) 
PS 20% Yes – worse 
prognosis (d= 
.51**) 
and less self-
efficacy (d= 
1.76**) 
No- less self-
blame (d= 1.01**), 
less perceived 
stigma (d= 
1.20**), less belief 
in personal 
weakness (d= 
.65**) 
Chemical-
imbalance and 
greater perceived 
TE for medication  
(d= 1.20**) and 
greater perceived 
TE for 
psychotherapy 
(d= 1.12**) 
France et al.  
(2007) 
262 
F= 59.5% 
Age=  18-
58  ȋμ= 23.6) 
Convenience 
survey 
(Midwest 
America) 
 
ANOVA 
a.Ȍηͳͺ 
b.)Enrolled on 
psychology classes 
 
Help-seeking  
ABs 
NA – author 
designed 
 
PS/BM Chemical-
imbalance 
=  84.7% 
 
 
NA  Endorsement of 
chemical-
imbalance 
associated with 
stronger 
preference for 
medical help* and 
less preference 
for talking 
therapies*. 
Goldstein & 
Rossellli 
(2003) 
66 
f= 44 
Age= 18-
22 
Survey  
(Connecticut, 
USA) 
 
Regression 
Analysis  
a.) University 
students 
ABs 
Empowermen
t 
TE 
Stigma 
NA-author 
designed 
BM NR No – reduced 
blame(r= .32*), 
increased help-
seeking (r= .30*), 
positive attitudes 
(r= .25*) 
 
BM and greater 
perceived TE for 
psychotherapy 
(r= .29*)  
Han et al.  
(2006) 
N= 299 
f= 218 
Age=  μ= 
20.3 
 
Experimental  
(Taiwan) 
 
ANCOVA 
a.) University 
undergraduates 
Biological ABs 
Blame 
Help-seeking  
Author 
designed: 
Biological 
Attribution 
Scale, 
Psychological 
Blame Scale, 
Help-Seeking 
Willingness 
Scale 
NA NR 
 
NR BM education 
increased BM 
ABs** 
 
BM education was 
associated with 
increased help-
seeking 
willingness* 
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Hansson et 
al.  (2010) 
319 
F= 72.9% 
Age= 18-
69 
( μ= 43.8) 
 
t-tests 
 
Survey  
(Sweden) 
 
 
a.)Primary care 
patients  
b.)Recent 
depressive episode 
 
ABs  NA– author 
designed 
PS 3.6%  NA  NA 
Jorm et al.  
(1997) 
N= 2031 
f= NR 
Age= NR 
Household 
survey 
(Australia) 
 
x2 
a.) Private residents 
b.)Age=  18-74 
years 
ABs 
Risk factors 
Recognition  
NA PS 50% 
genetic 
causes  
 
NA NA 
Jorm & 
Griffiths 
(2008) 
 
3998 Household 
survey  
(Australia) 
 
Regression 
analysis 
a.Ȍ ηͳͺ years 
 
 
Stigma: 
Social 
distance 
Dangerous 
Social distance 
scale (Link et 
al.  1999) 
Depression 
Stigma Scale 
(Griffiths et al.  
2006;2008) 
NR NR Trend- 
dangerousness OR 
0.98 (p>.98) 
 
Trend -  social 
distance (p>.06) 
NA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khasla et al.  
(2011) 
145 
F= 59% 
Age= 18-
70 
Observational  
(Philadelphia, 
America) 
 
Regression 
analysis 
 
 
a.)Major Depressive 
Disorder 
b.)No comorbidity 
Treatment 
preference 
ABs   
RFD  Addis et 
al., 1995). 
PS NR NA Trend to strong 
belief in chemical-
imbalance and 
preference for 
medication (d= 
.32; p<.07). 
 
PS beliefs 
associated with 
preference for 
psychotherapy 
(d= .47**) 
 
 
Kuyken et 
al.  (1992) 
SU= 20 
CP= 25 
L= 49 
Age/ 
gender: 
NR 
Interview/ 
survey 
(London, UK) 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
NA 
 
ABs 
Credibility  
TE 
NA– author 
designed 
 
 
 
L= PS 
CPs/SUs
= BM 
SUs= 65% 
CPs= 48% 
L= 14% 
NA Stronger BM 
beliefs associated 
with increased 
perceived TE for 
medication** 
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Lauber et al.  
(2003) 
873 
F= NR 
Age= NR 
Telephone 
survey 
(Switzerlan) 
 
 
NA EBs  NA– author 
designed 
PS Illness 
beliefs=  
25.7% 
NA NA 
Leykin et al.  
(2007) 
N= 172 
f= 101 
Age= μ= 
40.4 
Observationl  
(Pennsylvania, 
America) 
 
ANCOVA 
a.)RCT participants 
for CT efficacy b.Ȍηͳͺyears 
c.)Major Depression 
EBs 
Depressive 
symptomolog
y 
RFD (Addis et 
al., 1995) 
Hamilton 
Rating Scale 
for Depression 
(HRSD; 
Hamilton, 
1960). 
PS NR NA Trend towards 
higher BM  beliefs 
and worse 
outcomes in CT 
(p<.09) 
 
Successful 
treatment 
reduces 
treatment 
incongruent ABs: 
CT(d= -.36*) 
ADs ( d= -.54**) 
 
 
Meyer & 
Garcia-
Roberts 
(2007) 
N=  97 
f=  61 
Age=  μ= 
39.21 
Survey 
(London, UK) 
 
Regression 
analysis 
a.)Receiving  
psychological 
therapy for 
depression in 
primary care 
setting 
 
ABs 
Motivation  
RFD (Addis et 
al.  1995). 
Author 
developed: ǲMotivations 
For )nterventionsǳ 
scale (MFI). 
 
 
PS NR NA BM beliefs 
correlate with 
motivation for 
medical 
treatments (r= 
.77**) 
McKeon & 
Carrick  
(1991) 
 
1403 
f= 701 
Age= NR 
Survey  
(Ireland) 
 
Descriptive 
a.Ȍ ηͳ͸years 
 
 
 
Stigma 
Treatability 
Causes 
Treatment 
preference 
Illness belief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
PS Illness 
beliefs = 
33% 
Chemical-
imbalance 
= 9% 
 
 
 
 
NA 
  
NA 
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Nieuwsma 
& Pepper 
(2010) 
N=  69 
f= NR 
Age= NR 
Observational 
(Wyoming, 
America) 
 
Regression 
analysis 
a.) Undergraduate 
psychology 
students 
ABs 
Stigma  
Self-efficacy 
 
Modified - 
Survey of 
etiological 
beliefs and 
treatment 
effectiveness 
(Goldstein & 
Rosselli, 2003) 
 
Stigma Scale 
(Nieuwsma & 
Pepper, 2010) 
 
PDQ– Self 
efficacy 
subscale 
(Manber et al., 
2003) 
 
 
PS/BM NR No - no significant 
association 
between BM ABs 
and stigma. 
 
No - PS ABs 
correlated with 
higher 
authoritarian 
stigma r= .29* 
 
 
PS ABs correlated 
with perceived TE 
of self-initiated 
treatments (r= 
.33**). 
 
Trend - BM ABs 
correlated with 
perceived TE of 
medical 
treatment (r= .23, 
p<.06) 
Ogden et al.  
(1998) 
N= 769 
Patient: 
n= 681/ 
f= 481  
Age=   μ= 
44.81 
GPs: 
n= 90/ f= 
33 Age μ =  
41.92 
Survey 
(England) 
 
ANOVA 
a.Ȍηͳ͸years 
b.)Patients or GPs 
from nine practices 
in England 
ABs 
 
NA L= PS 
 
GPs=  
BM/PS 
 
SUs=  
BM/PS 
NR NA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paykel et al.  
(1998) 
N=  
1991: 
2009 
1995:205
0 
1997:194
6 
f= NR 
Age= NR 
 
Household 
survey 
(Great Britain) 
 
ANOVA 
a.Ȍηͳͷ years 
b.)Residents 
ABs 
Illness belief 
Stigma 
Willingness to 
seek help 
NA PS In 1997: 
 
Medical 
illness 
belief =  
81% 
 
Brain 
changes = 
43% 
NA- Stigmatising 
attitudes 
remained 
consistent over 
the time period.     
 
Willingness to 
seek professional 
support and 
endorsement of 
anti-depressant 
treatment 
increased over 
time in line with 
increased illness 
beliefs. 
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Pescosolido 
et al.  
(2010) 
N= 1956 
f= 998 
Age=  μ= 
45 
Household 
Survey 
(America) 
 
Logistical 
regression 
 
a.)Residents b.Ȍηͳͺ years ABs TE 
Stigma 
NR NR  Chemical-
imbalance
= 80 
Yes - 
dangerousness to 
self OR= 5.04** 
dangerousness to 
others OR= 2.70** 
NA 
Rusch et al.  
(2009) 
N= 86 
f= 62 Age μ= 
21.45 
Experimental 
(Wisconsin, 
America) 
 
ANOVA 
a.) Undergraduate 
psychology 
students 
ABs 
Stigma  
Behavioural 
intentions 
Depression 
beliefs 
(Goldstein & 
Rosselli, 2003) 
Depression 
Attribution 
Questionnaire-
27 (Corrigan et 
al., 2003). 
 
PS/BM NR NA- increasing 
biological 
attribution did not 
significantly 
reduce stigma. 
NA 
Schweizer 
et al.  
(2010) 
221 
F= 128 Age:  μ= 
42 
Observational 
Community 
clinic 
(Maastricht, 
Holland) 
 
ANOVA 
 
a.)Major 
depression/dysthy
mia 
b.)No acute suicide 
risk 
ABs   
Treatment 
preference 
 
Reasons For 
Depression 
(RFD; Addis, 
Taux & 
Jacobson, 
1995). 
PS NR NA  BM  ABs 
associated with 
preference for 
medication* 
 
PS  ABs 
associated with 
preference for 
CBT* 
Srinivasan 
et  al.  
(2003) 
N= 102 
f= 67 
Age=  μ= 
41.1 
Out-patient 
survey 
(Canada) 
 
Regression 
analysis. 
a.) Depressive 
disorder 
b.)Referred to a 
psychiatric 
outpatient clinic 
ABs 
 
NA-author 
designed 
PS NR NA NA 
Wong et al.  
(2010) 
N= 223 
f= 156 
Age= μ=  
23.6 
 
 
Survey/ 
Content 
analysis 
(USA) 
 
x2 
a.)>18 years 
b.)East, South, 
South East Asian 
decent 
c.) Psychology 
graduates/ 
therapists excluded 
ABs 
Willingness to 
seek help 
Enculturation  
Asian 
American 
Values Scale –
Multidimensio
nal (Kim et al., 
2005). 
PS BM= 25.1.   NA BM ABs 
associated with 
greater 
willingness to 
seek professional 
help** 
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D. Vignettes 
Biological condition 
D is experiencing difficulties typical of biological depression including depressed mood, 
poor sleep, reduced appetite and poor motivation. D has been struggling with these 
symptoms for almost six months and this is significantly impacting their functioning. 
 
D reports difficulty sleeping and has been experiencing early morning waking. D rarely 
sleeps in past 4 or 5am. As a result they spend long periods of time lying in bed 
ruminating about their problems. They have also noticed a reduction in their appetite 
and frequently skip meals. 
 
They have been feeling very lethargic and lacking in energy. When not at work D rarely 
feels up to doing much. D used to like going for a run before work but despite waking 
early no longer has the drive to do so. 
 D has a close family. Dǯs cousin had a significant episode of depression for which they had treatment. Dǯs family were very supportive and have a good understanding of the 
impact of depression. However, D finds it very difficult to talk about how they feel and 
has become withdrawn from both family and friends. 
 
D has always enjoyed work but is struggling to stay motivated and concentrate and their 
performance is beginning to slide. Their reduced performance has been highlighted in a 
recent appraisal and D is beginning to worry about their own competence. D is often 
tearful and feels guilty about their poor work performance and for ignoring friends. 
 
 D sometimes feels life is not worthwhile anymore and wishes they werenǯt here. 
Although finding it difficult to cope D has not expressed any suicidal intention or 
thoughts of harming themself. 
 
(Respondents: 33.34%) 
 
 Psychosocial condition 
 
D is experiencing difficulties typical of psychosocial depression including depressed 
mood, poor sleep, reduced appetite and poor motivation. D has been struggling with 
these symptoms for almost six months and this is significantly impacting on their 
functioning. 
 
D is spending long periods of time lying in bed ruminating about their problems. As a 
result they have had difficulty sleeping and have been waking early in the morning, 
rarely sleeping in later than 4 or 5am. They have also noticed a reduction in their 
appetite and frequently skip meals.  
 
They have been feeling very lethargic and lacking in energy. When not at work D rarely 
feels up to doing much. D used to like going for a run before work but despite waking 
early no longer has the drive to do so. D has a close family. Dǯs cousin had a significant episode of depression for which they had treatment. Dǯs family were very supportive and have a good understanding of the 
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impact of depression. However, D finds it very difficult to talk about how they feel and 
has become withdrawn from both family and friends. 
 
D has always enjoyed work but is struggling to stay motivated and concentrate and their 
performance is beginning to slide. Their reduced performance has been highlighted in a 
recent appraisal and D is beginning to worry about their own competence. D is often 
tearful and feels guilty about their poor work performance and for ignoring friends. 
 
D sometimes feels life is not worthwhile anymore and wishes they werenǯt here. 
Although finding it difficult to cope D has not expressed any suicidal intention or 
thoughts of harming themself. 
 
(Respondents: 33.33%) 
 
Control (neutral) condition 
 
D is experiencing difficulties typical of depression including depressed mood, poor 
sleep, reduced appetite and poor motivation. D has been struggling with these 
symptoms for almost six months and this is significantly impacting their functioning. 
 
D is spending long periods of time lying in bed ruminating about their problems. As a 
result they have had difficulty sleeping and have been waking early in the morning, 
rarely sleeping in later than 4 or 5am. They have also noticed a reduction in their 
appetite and frequently skip meals.  
 
They have been feeling very lethargic and lacking in energy. When not at work D rarely 
feels up to doing much. D used to like going for a run before work but despite waking 
early no longer has the drive to do so.  
 D has a close family. Dǯs cousin had a significant episode of depression for which they had treatment. Dǯs family were very supportive and have a good understanding of the 
impact of depression. However, D finds it very difficult to talk about how they feel and 
has become withdrawn from both family and friends. 
 
D has always enjoyed work but is struggling to stay motivated and concentrate and their 
performance is beginning to slide. Their reduced performance has been highlighted in a 
recent appraisal and D is beginning to worry about their own competence. D is often 
tearful and feels guilty about their poor work performance and for ignoring friends. 
 D sometimes feels life is not worthwhile anymore and wishes they werenǯt here. 
Although finding it difficult to cope D has not expressed any suicidal intention or 
thoughts of harming themself. 
 
(Respondents: 33.33%) 
 
E. Survey  
 Instructions 
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Following completion of the consent form you will be redirected to a client vignette. 
Please take time to read the vignette. Following this a series of questionnaires will be 
presented. These ask questions relating to your beliefs and thoughts regarding the 
client. 
 
The questionnaire should take no longer than 15-20 minutes to complete. You can leave 
the survey at any point by pressing the exit survey link in the top right hand corner of 
the screen. If you choose to leave the survey it will be assumed you have used your right 
to withdraw study and your answers will not be included in the research. Once you have 
completed the questionnaire you will be asked to fill in your demographic details. 
 
IF YOU WISH TO ENTER THE PRIZE DRAW YOU WILL NEED TO CLICK ON A LINK TO 
FILL IN A REGISTRATION FORM. THIS ASKS FOR YOUR NAME AND EMAIL ADDRESS TO 
ENABLE US TO CONTACT YOU IF YOU WIN. THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT BE LINKED 
TO YOUR DATA OR USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. THERE ARE 4 PRIZES OF 
AMAZON GIFT VOUCHERS WORTH £50, £25, £15 AND £10. THE DRAW WILL TAKE 
PLACE ONCE DATA COLLECTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.* 
 
If you wish to receive a study debrief or have any queries please contact myself using 
the contact details emailed to you, which will also be presented again at the end of the 
survey. 
 
*no later than March 2013 
Welcome to the survey 
 Consent 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 
To continue, please read the following statements and check the box to confirm your 
agreement:  
 
1. I agree to participate in this study and to complete an online questionnaire for 
the purposes of the study described. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any 
time before the completion of data collection. 
 
3. I understand that data will be kept confidentially and securely and will be 
anonymised for write up. 
 
4. I understand that to maintain your anonymity a full debrief about the purpose of 
the study will not be provided automatically. This debrief can be requested by 
emailing the researcher on the contact details provided. 
 
5. I understand if I have any questions or concerns I can contact the researcher 
using the contact details given. 
 
                            [  ]    I CONFIRM I AGREE WITH THE STATEMENTS LISTED  
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Vignette  
 Please read the following description of Client Dǯs depression. You will then be asked to 
answer a series of questions. These will involve you reflecting upon your thoughts and 
ideas relating to this client. 
[Random presentation of vignette] 
Motivation check 
Please check the symptoms of depression that client D is experiencing. 
 
□  Low or depressed mood 
□  Difficulties sleeping or sleeping too much 
□  Loss of interest or pleasure 
□  Feelings of worthlessness 
□  Difficulties concentrating 
□  Loss of energy 
□  Guilt 
□  Irritability 
□  Changes in appetite 
□  Thoughts of harming oneself or/and thoughts of suicide 
 
Causal beliefs 
Holding the client in mind, please indicate how much you feel each of the following 
factors is likely to be a leading cause in their depression. 
 
 Definitely 
not a 
cause 
1 
Slightly 
not a cause 
2 
No opinion 
 
3 
Slightly a 
cause 
4 
Definitely 
a cause 
5 
Psychological factorsPS □ □ □ □ □ 
Biological factors B □ □ □ □ □ 
Environmental factorsPS □ □ □ □ □ 
A chemical imbalance in the brain or 
nervous system B 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of social supportPS □ □ □ □ □ 
Learned helplessnessPS  □ □ □ □ □ 
A genetic or inherited predisposition B □ □ □ □ □ 
Biochemical abnormalities B □ □ □ □ □ 
Recent misfortunesPS □ □ □ □ □ 
General stressPS □ □ □ □ □ 
Response to a negative life eventPS □ □ □ □ □ 
Disease in the brain B □ □ □ □ □ Expecting too much of oneǯs selfPS □ □ □ □ □ 
A poor cognitive outlook on the 
worldPS 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Biological changes within the brain or 
nervous system B 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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A melancholic personalityPS □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of will powerPS □ □ □ □ □ 
      
NB.  PS denotes items on the psychosocial scale, B denotes items on the biological scale 
Treatment effectiveness (ow effective do you feel the following would be in treating this clientǯs depression? 
 Definitely 
Ineffective 
1 
Moderatel
y 
Ineffective 
2 
Slightly 
Ineffective 
3 
Not sure/ 
possibly 
4 
Slightly 
Effective 
5 
Moderatel
y 
Effective 
6 
Definitely 
Effective 
7 
AntidepressantsM □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
HospitalisationM □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT) M 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Vitamins/herbal 
remediesSM 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Recreational DrugsSM □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
AlcoholSM □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
PsychotherapyP □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Behavioral TherapyP □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Cognitive TherapyP □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Deal with it aloneSI □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
ExerciseSI □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Relaxation / 
meditation / yogaSI 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
PsychoeducationSI □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Getting out moreSI □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
NB. M denotes items on the medical subscale, P denotes items on the psychological therapy subscale, SM 
denotes items on self-medication subscale, SI denotes items on the self-initiated subscale 
 Self-efficacy 
To what extent do you feel the client would be able to use the following to manage their 
depression? 
 
 Not at all 
1 
Somewhat 
2 
Quite a lot 
3 
Very much so 
4 
 
Clarifying their priorities in life □ □ □ □ 
Improving their relationships with others □ □ □ □ 
Understanding themselves better □ □ □ □ 
Increasing their social support  □ □ □ □ 
Changing how they think about themself □ □ □ □ 
Changing their behaviours □ □ □ □ 
Working hard at solving some of their 
problems 
□ □ □ □ 
Having a confidant □ □ □ □ 
Seeking help from talking to others □ □ □ □ 
Making changes in their life □ □ □ □ 
Improving their family situation □ □ □ □ 
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Letting time heal □ □ □ □ 
Increasing their activities □ □ □ □ 
Getting psychotherapy □ □ □ □ 
Learning to cope with stress □ □ □ □ 
Exercising regularly □ □ □ □ 
Improving their diet □ □ □ □ 
improving their health □ □ □ □ 
Developing a relationship □ □ □ □ 
Becoming more centred/well-balanced □ □ □ □ 
Using self-help □ □ □ □ 
Having an explanation for their 
depression 
□ □ □ □ 
Participating in support groups □ □ □ □ 
Making changes in their situation □ □ □ □ 
 
Control-cure 
 
Holding the client in mind, please indicate how much you agree with the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
1 
Disagree 
 
 
2 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
 
3 
Agree 
 
 
4 
Strongly 
agree 
 
5 
Their depression will improve with time □ □ □ □ □ 
Recovery from their depression is 
largely based on chanceC 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Treatment will be effective in curing 
their depression 
□ □ □ □ □ 
There is a lot they can do to control their 
depressionC 
□ □ □ □ □ 
What they do determines whether their 
depression gets better or worseC 
□ □ □ □ □ 
There is very little that can be done to 
improve their depression 
□ □ □ □ □ 
NB. c  denotes items on the control subscale  
Stigma 
For the following statements, think of how other people might treat this client.  Use the 
scale provided to rate your agreement with each statement. 
 )n general, other people would… 
 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
1 
Disagree 
 
 
2 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
 
3 
Agree 
 
 
4 
Strongly 
agree 
 
5 …perceive them as unpredictableDg □ □ □ □ □ …think they are incompetentA □ □ □ □ □ …discriminate against themD □ □ □ □ □ …see them as needyDp □ □ □ □ □ 
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…pity themAf □ □ □ □ □ …try to control themA □ □ □ □ □ …treat them unfairlyD □ □ □ □ □ … not think they have self-controlDg □ □ □ □ □ …become angry with themAf □ □ □ □ □ …view them as irresponsibleA □ □ □ □ □ …believe they are dependentDp □ □ □ □ □ … not give them equal treatmentD □ □ □ □ □ …believe they are aggressiveDg □ □ □ □ □ …get annoyed with themAf □ □ □ □ □ …believe that they need additional 
careA 
□ □ □ □ □ …be frightened by themDg □ □ □ □ □ …ridicule themAf □ □ □ □ □ …be biased against themD □ □ □ □ □ …be insecure when with themAf □ □ □ □ □ …attempt to make decisions for 
themA 
□ □ □ □ □ …think they are dangerousDg □ □ □ □ □ …be irritated by themAf □ □ □ □ □ …would see them as powerlessA □ □ □ □ □ …would be unjust towards themD □ □ □ □ □ … would become frustrated with 
themAf 
□ □ □ □ □ 
NB. Dg denotes dangerousness, A denotes authoritarianism, D denotes discrimination, Dp denotes 
dependency, Af denotes affectivity. 
Clinicians’ attitudes 
If you, or a psychologist within an appropriate service, were able to offer this client psychological therapy… 
 
How motivated do you feel the client would be for treatment? 
Where 0% is completely unmotivated and 100% is completely motivated. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 
 
How effective do you feel treatment would be? 
Where 0% is completely ineffective and 100% is completely effective. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
If treatment was successful how likely do you feel it is that that they would relapse 
following treatment? 
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Where 0% is that they are definitely going to remain well and 100% is that they will 
definitely relapse. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
How intensive do you feel therapy would need to be? 
Where 0% is the least intensive available and 100% is the most intensive available. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
How likely do you feel they would be to drop out of treatment? 
Where 0% is that they would definitely complete treatment and 100% is that they 
would definitely drop out of treatment. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
How curable do you think their depression is? 
Where 0% is completely incurable and 100% is completely curable. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Is hospitalisation needed? 
Where 0% is hospitalisation is definitely not needed and 100% is that hospitalisation is 
definitely needed.  
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
How disabling do you think their depression is for them? 
Where 0% is not at all disabling and 100% is completely disabling. 
0% 
 
(1) 
10% 
 
(2) 
20% 
 
(3) 
30% 
 
(4) 
40% 
 
(5) 
50% 
 
(6) 
60% 
 
(7) 
70% 
 
(8) 
80% 
 
(9) 
90% 
 
(10) 
100% 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
How likely do you think they would be to harm themselves? 
Where 0% means that you feel they would definitely not harm themself and 100% is 
that they will definitely harm themself. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Demographics and background information 
Thank you for answering the questions in relation to the client vignette. Please spend a few more 
moments completing the demographic and background questionnaire. 
 
 
What do you think was the purpose of the study? 
  
[free response] 
What is your gender? 
  
     
 
What is your age? 
 
[drop down menu to enter age] 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 
Black British □ 
Black African □ 
Black Carribean □ 
Black other □ 
White British □ 
White European □ 
White other □ 
Pakistani □ 
Indian □ 
Chinese □ 
Asian other □ 
Mixed race □ 
Other □ 
Prefer not to say □ 
If other, please state: [free response] 
 
 
What year of clinical training are you in? 
 
  
First Second Third 
□ □ □ 
 
 
Which clinical training course on you on? 
 
_Bangor University North Wales 
Male Female 
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_University of Bath 
_University of Birmingham 
_Coventry and Warwick 
_University of East Anglia 
_University of East London 
_University of Edinburgh NHS Scotland 
_University of Essex Tavistock 
_University of Exeter 
_University of Glasgow NHS Scotland 
_University of Hertfordshire 
_Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London 
_Lancaster University 
_University of Leeds 
_University of Leicester 
_University of Liverpool 
_University of Manchester 
_Newcastle University 
_North Thames University College London 
_Oxford 
_Plymouth University 
_Royal Holloway, University of London 
_Salomons, Canterbury Christ Church University 
_University of Sheffield 
_Shropshire and Staffordshire 
_University of Southampton 
_South Wales 
_University of Surrey 
_Teesside University 
_Trent Universities of Lincoln and Nottingham 
 
Would you identify yourself with a particular theoretical orientation?  
 
Yes □ 
No □ 
Not sure □ 
 
If yes, please state [free response] 
 
                                
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale provided. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
1 
Mildly 
disagree 
2 
Neutral 
 
3 
Mildly 
agree 
4 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
Psychology is the most important factor in 
the cause of mental illness. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Biology is the most important factor in the 
cause of mental illness. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The environment is the most important 
factor in the cause of mental illness. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Closing information 
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Thank you for your time and participation with this research study. You can request a 
full debrief and information about the study by email. If you would like to do this or 
have any questions regarding the study please contact the principal researcher on the 
contact details below. If requested, debrief information will be sent out following 
completion of the study. 
 
If you are concerned that you may need support around your own emotional wellbeing 
please contact your GP or for advice about yourself or someone else you can call NHS 
direct on 0845 4647 or visit: www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk . 
 
For advice and information on depression you can also go to: 
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Depression/Pages/Introduction.aspx 
 
Contact details: 
Kerry Tate 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Salomons Campus, Canterbury Christchurch University 
Email: kt149@canterbury.ac.uk 
Supervised by: 
Dr Blake Stobie 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma . 
Email: blake.stobie@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Professor Paul Camic 
Research Director 
Canterbury Christchurch University 
Email: paul.camic@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
 
If you want to make a complaint about the research: 
Please direct any complaints to Prof Margie Callanan, 
Department of Applied Psychology, Canterbury Christ Church University, Broomhill 
Rd., Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN3 0T  
 
To enter the prize draw please add your contact details by following the link Click here to take 
survey 
 
F. Factor Analysis 
 
Table of factor analysis item loadings 
 Engagement Treatment 
effectiveness 
Severity Risk 
Motivation .77* .07 -.13 -.30 
Drop out .74* .09 -.11 .21 
Relapse .57* .06 -.07 .37 
Curability -.06 .87* .05 .06 
Effectiveness .24 .78* -.12 -.01 
Disability .06 .02 .79* -.34 
Intensity of 
treatment 
-.13 -.08 .72* .26 
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needed 
Risk of self-
harm 
.38 -.07 .41 .48* 
Need for 
hospitalisation 
.06 .08 .04 .82* 
*Designates the highest loadings. 
 
Scree plot (spss output) 
 
 
G. Ethics Approval 
 
THIS HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ELECTRONIC COPY 
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H. Recruitment Email 
Dear XXXX, 
 
I am a second year trainee from Salomons Clinical Doctorate course. I am currently 
recruiting participants for my thesis. The study has full ethics approval (a copy is 
attached to the email. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could forward this email to all trainees on the XXXX 
Clinical Psychology course. 
 
Thank you 
 
XXXX 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dear Trainee 
 
I am currently recruiting participants to take part in my major research project. The 
research has received full ethics approval from Salomons Ethics Panel. 
 
As a thank you for your time you can enter into a prize draw to win one of 4 Amazon 
vouchers for £10, £15, £25 or £50. 
 
The study involves completing an anonymous survey examining clinicians' beliefs about 
mental health problems. This should take no longer than 15-20 minutes to complete. 
 
Please see attached information sheet for further details and contact 
information. 
 
To participate please click on the link below: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/896VDPZ 
 
Thank you 
XXXX 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
Salomons Campus 
Broomhill Road 
Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN3 0TG 
I. Participant Information Sheet: 
 
Salomons Campus at Tunbridge Wells, 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
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This study is part of a third year major research project for the Clinical Psychology Doctorate at 
Canterbury Christ Church University. 
 
What is the study about? 
 The study is looking at cliniciansǯ beliefs about mental health problems. A full debrief about the 
purpose and rationale for the study can be requested from the researcher. This will be emailed 
once data collection has been completed. 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
 
As a clinical psychology trainee your perspectives are valued for the purposes of this study. 
 
Will I be paid to take part? 
 
No, however everyone who takes part will be able to entered into a free prize draw. There are 4 
prizes of Amazon vouchers worth £50, £25, £15, £10. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. Participation is voluntary. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at anytime 
and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen if I do agree to take part? 
 
1. If you agree to take part you can access the survey via the hyperlink. You will be asked to 
consent to your participation in the study. You are free to withdraw your consent up 
until the point of completing the survey. 
 
2. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be presented with a set of instructions and 
asked to read a vignette. 
 
3. You will then be asked to complete a series of questionnaires. This should take no more 
than 15-20 minutes. 
 
4. Once you have completed the survey you will be able to access a prize draw registration 
form. You will be contacted by email if you win.  Personal details for the prize draw will 
be kept separately from the research data maintaining anonymity. The prize draw will 
be completed within 2 weeks of data completion (no later than March 2013) 
 
5. If you would like to receive further information about the study or a full debrief you can 
email the researcher to request this. Once the entire questionnaire data has been 
collected you will then be emailed with a full debrief. 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
Information will be kept confidential and your name and identifying data will NOT appear in 
any reports.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
 
Results will be written up for the purposes of a doctorate thesis and submitted for publication. 
 
Contact details: 
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Should you have any further queries, or would like further information, please contact Kerry 
Tate who will be carrying out the research.  
 
Confidentiality 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within Canterbury Christ Church 
University premises in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Universityǯs own 
data protection requirements.  Data can only be accessed by the principal researcher XXXX and 
research supervisors (XXXXX). 
 After completion of the study, all data will be remain anonymous.  
 
[CANDIATE INFORMATION REMOVED] 
 
If I want to make a complaint about the research. 
Please direct any complaints to Prof Margie Callanan, 
Department of Applied Psychology, Canterbury Christ Church University, Broomhill 
Rd., Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN3 0TG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Research summary for participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salomons Campus at Tunbridge Wells, 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences 
 
Re. Debrief and summary: Clinician’s attitudes study 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in the on-line study exploring cliniciansǯ beliefs 
about depression. All the data has now been collected and the study has been submitted as part 
of my clinical doctoral thesis. 
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The study 
Over 200 trainee clinical psychologists, across England, Scotland and Wales, took part in the 
survey.  Participants were randomised to an experimental condition in which one of three 
vignettes was presented. The experimental vignettes stated the client was experiencing symptoms which were either ǲtypical of…ǳ either, ǲbiological depressionǳ or ǲpsychosocial 
depression.ǳ )n the third, control condition, a neutral vignette was presented in which the symptoms were simply framed as ǲtypical of depression.ǳ All other information about the client was the same across conditions. The study examined clinicianǯs causal models of depression 
with respect to the client vignette presented. 
 
The study aimed to explore a.) whether framing the depression as a biological or psychosocial 
would bias trainees causal beliefs, and b) whether causal beliefs impact treatment decisions and 
attitudes.  
 
Questionnaires examined the likely causes of the depression, the treatments that were felt to be 
most effectiveness, perceived controllability of the depression and perceived stigma. In 
addition, the questionnaire examined therapist optimism towards psychological treatment of 
the client.  
 
Background and objectives 
There is lack of research examining the impact of causal models on cliniciansǯ attitudes. 
Previous research has suggested that biological explanations of depression increase clinical psychologistsǯ perceptions of the effectiveness of medical treatments whilst reducing the 
perceived efficacy of psychological therapy. Causal explanations have also been shown to 
influence professional attitudes to depression. Studies suggest that biological explanations 
reduce perceptions of self-efficacy and control over symptoms. The current study aimed to 
explore whether cliniciansǯ causal models of a clientǯs depression can be biased by aetiological 
labelling and in turn, whether cliniciansǯ causal models impact clinical judgements and attitudes.   
 
This is of importance as there is no evidence to support varying treatment by depression 
subtype (NICE, 2009).  
 
Findings 
Data was analysed using ANOVA.  There was a small effect of the manipulation in the predicted 
direction; labelling the depression as biological increased causal attributions of biological 
factors and reduced ratings of stress and negative life events as likely causes. In turn, the 
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biological condition led to increased perceptions of the effectiveness of medical treatments. 
Labelling depression as psychosocial did not affect causal beliefs or perceptions of treatment 
effectiveness but did seem to have a small effect on increasing perceptions of stigma.  There was 
no effect of condition on ratings of psychological therapy, perceptions of controllability of the 
depression or on optimism for psychological treatment.  
 Exploratory analysis was also conducted to examine the impact of participantsǯ primary causal 
beliefs about the depression on attitudes (this was independent of experimental group). There 
were substantial effects of strongly endorsing biological causal beliefs; this led to increased 
judgements of effectiveness of medical treatments (large effect) and lower perceptions of client 
engagement in therapy (medium effect). The data also suggested that people who more strongly 
endorsed biological explanations perceived the client to be more risky (e.g. self-harm). 
Participants who did not hold strong causal models of the depression rated the depression to be 
less controllable.  There was no effect of causal models on stigma or perceptions of psychology 
therapy as being effective.  
  
What did I conclude?  Findings suggest that cliniciansǯ casual models of a clientǯs depression can bias clinical-
judgements.  There were limitations to the current study, such as multiple self-report measures, 
no measure of behavioural intentions, and the use of multiple comparisons. In addition, this 
study examined attitudes to a client vignette and may not generalise to real -life settings. 
However, clinical vignettes are widely used in research and do have validity; clinicians often 
receive written referral information as first source of information about a client. 
 
The study offers preliminary support that holding biological causal models of depression can 
bias judgements of treatment effectiveness and client engagement.  Leading trainees to more 
strongly endorse medical treatments such anti-depressants, even when they are unlikely to be 
indicated by the evidence-base or client data and to perceive clients to be less likely to engage 
fully in psychological therapy.  The effect sizes were substantive and warrant further 
confirmatory studies.   
 
The experimental findings also suggested that labelling depression as biological can bias 
clinicians towards endorsing biological causal beliefs and medical treatments. This was a small 
effect and less conclusive. Given the subtly of the manipulation used in the study the effect 
seems worthy of further investigation. More research is needed to see if these findings can be 
reliably replicated.  
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Confidentiality 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within Canterbury Christ Church 
University premises in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Universityǯs own 
data protection requirements.  Data can only be accessed by the principal researcher and 
research supervisors. After completion of the study, all data will be remain anonymous.  
Thank you again for your time and participation with this research study. If you have any 
questions regarding the study please contact the principal researcher on the contact details 
below. 
 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Salomon’s Campus, Canterbury Christ Church University 
Email 
Supervised by: 
  
                                                                           
 
If I want to make a complaint about the research. 
Please direct any complaints to Prof Margie Callanan, 
Department of Applied Psychology, Canterbury Christ Church University, Broomhill 
Rd., Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN3 0TG 
 
 
K. Reliability and normality of scales 
Table 9. 
Normality and reliability analysis 
 Ƚ itemǯs 
deleted 
Ƚ before 
item 
deleted 
Number of 
items on 
final scale 
Skew Kurtosis 
Biological  .87 No - 6 -.37 -.24 
Psychosocial .66 No - 11 .23 -.57 
Medical 
treatments 
.57 No - 3 .45 -.33 
Psychological 
treatment* 
.67 No - 3 -.63 .78 
Self-initiated 
treatment 
.73 ǲmanaging aloneǳ .51 4 .54 1.5 
Self-
medication** 
.79 ǲvitamins/herbalǳ .53 2 1.4 .17 
Control-Cure .54 No - 6 -.85 .75 
Control .62 No - 3 -.81 .17 
Self-efficacy .92 No - 24 .13 .17 
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Stigma .93 No - 25 -1.11 2.15 
Authoritarian .74 No - 6 -1.12 1.65 
Discrimination .93 No - 5 -.85 .66 
Dependency .76 No - 2 -.65 -.06 
Dangerousness .72 No - 5 .21 .24 
Affectivity .84 No - 7 -1.34 2.89 
Engagement .56 No - 3 -.07 -.21 
Treatment 
Effectiveness 
.55 No - 2 -.59 .48 
Severity** .39 No - 2 -.56 .17 
Risk** .43 No - 2 .37 .11 
*One extreme outlier removed **Log transformations applied 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L. Correlations 
Table 10.  
Correlation matrix 
  B PS M P SI SM SE CC S E Eg R S 
SEB: 
Biological (B) 
r 
p 
N 
1.00 
 
217 
            
SEB: 
Psychosocial 
(PS) 
r 
p 
N 
-.05 
.51 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
           
STE:  Medical 
(M) 
r 
p 
N 
.46** 
.00 
217 
-.05 
.46 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
          
STE: 
Psychological 
(P) 
r 
p 
N 
.04 
.52 
216 
.12 
.09 
216 
.06 
.42 
216 
1.00 
 
216 
         
STE: Self-
Initiated (SI) 
r 
p 
N 
.07 
.33 
217 
.16* 
.02 
217 
.05 
.48 
217 
.45** 
.00 
216 
1.00 
 
217 
        
STE: Self-
medication 
(SM) 
r 
p 
N 
.03 
.63 
217 
.04 
.57 
217 
.11 
.11 
217 
-.17 
.02 
216 
-.04 
.61 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
       
Self-efficacy 
(SE) 
r 
p 
N 
.08 
.22 
217 
.41** 
.00 
217 
.12 
.07 
217 
.33** 
.00 
216 
.43** 
.00 
217 
-.03 
.65 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
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Control-Cure 
(CC) 
r 
p 
N 
.06 
.42 
217 
.14* 
.04 
217 
.09 
.21 
217 
.30** 
.00 
216 
.24** 
.00 
217 
-.20** 
.01 
217 
.35** 
.00 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
     
Overall 
stigma (S) 
r 
p 
N 
.04 
.60 
217 
.24* 
.00 
217 
.11 
.11 
217 
.156* 
.02 
216 
.20** 
.01 
217 
.04 
.59 
217 
.24** 
.00 
217 
.08 
.25 
217 
1.0
0 
 
217 
    
CAQ: 
Effectiveness 
(E) 
r 
p 
N 
-.17 
.09 
217 
.13 
.06 
217 
-.03 
.67 
217 
.25** 
.00 
216 
.16* 
.02 
217 
-.16** 
.02 
217 
.29** 
.00 
217 
.43** 
.00 
217 
.15* 
.03 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
   
CAQ: 
Engagement 
(Eg) 
r 
p 
N 
-.16* 
.02 
217 
.13* 
.05 
217 
-.13* 
.05 
217 
.10 
.16 
216 
.07 
.32 
217 
-.11 
.12 
217 
.19** 
.01 
217 
.10 
.15 
217 
.05 
.43 
217 
.20** 
.01 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
  
CAQ: Risk (R) r 
p 
N 
.17* 
.01 
217 
-.03 
.70 
217 
.06 
.37 
217 
.14* 
.04 
216 
-.19** 
.01 
217 
-.05 
.46 
217 
-.01 
.89 
217 
-.09 
.20 
217 
.01 
.89 
217 
-.02 
.73 
217 
-.22** 
.01 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
 
CAQ: Severity 
(S) 
r 
p 
N 
.06 
.36 
217 
.20** 
.00 
217 
.04 
.55 
217 
-.03 
.71 
216 
.03 
.68 
217 
.02 
.81 
217 
.18** 
.01 
217 
-.11 
.10 
217 
.14* 
.04 
217 
-.03 
..68 
217 
-.04 
.61 
217 
.50** 
.00 
217 
1.00 
 
217 
*Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed) **Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
 
M. Interaction analysis 
Causal beliefs about mental illness. Participants who scored above the mean on 
either biological (n= 93) or psychosocial (n= 44) causal beliefs about mental illness 
were extracted for use in the analysis.  A two-way (3x2), group x mental illness beliefs, 
ANOVA was conducted. There was a large effect of mental illness beliefs on biological 
causal ratings, F(1,131)= 25.09, p<.001, ηp2= .16, P= 1.00. People who felt biological 
causes were important in mental illness were more likely to see the cause of the clients 
depression as biological,  relative to participants who only strangely endorsed 
psychosocial causes  as important in mental illness (mean difference= 2.45, std. error= 
0.65). There was no main effect of mental illness beliefs on psychosocial causal ratings, 
F(1,131)= 3.17,p= .077, ηp2= .02, P= 0.42. 
There was no significant interaction effect on biological, F(2,131)=  1.13, p= .33, ηp2<.02, P= 0.25, or psychosocial causal ratings of depression, F(2,131)= .38, p= .68, ηp2<.01, P= 0.11.  
Year of training.  A two-way (3x3), group x year, ANOVA was conducted. There 
was a significant main effect of year of training on ratings of biological causes, F(2,208)= 
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4.09, p= .Ͳʹ, ηp2= .04, P= .72.  Participants in the first year of training had significantly 
higher ratings of biological causality than those in their third year (mean difference = 
.30, p<.01, std. error= 0.11).  There was no significant effect of year on psychosocial 
ratings of causality, F(2,208)= 0.99, p= .͵͹, ηp2<.01, P= 0.22. 
There was no significant interaction effect on biological, F(4,208)= 0.54, p= .71, ηp2= .01, P= 0.18, or psychosocial causal ratings, F(4,208)= 0.84,p= .ͷͲ, ηp2= .02, P= 
0.27.  
Identifying with a theoretical orientation. A two-way ANOVA (3x2), group x 
theoretical orientation (Yes, N= 53; No, N= 119) was conducted.  There was a significant 
main effect on psychosocial causal ratings F (1, 166) = 5.72, p<.02, ηp2= .03, P= .67. 
People who stated they had a theoretical orientation gave higher ratings of psychosocial 
causes (mean= 3.33, std. error= .05) compared to those who did not identify with a 
theoretical orientation (mean= 3.17, standard error= .04). There was no main effect of 
identifying with a theoretical orientation on biological causal ratings F(1,166) = 1.47 p= .ʹ͹, ηp2= <.001, P= 0.23.    
There was no significant interaction effect on biological causes, F(2,166)= 0.20, 
p= .ͺʹ,ηp2<.01,P= .08, or on psychosocial causes, F(2,166) = .58, p= .ͻͶ,ηp2<.01, P= 0.06. 
Gender.  A two-way (3x2), group x gender, ANOVA was conducted. There was no 
main effect of gender on biological causal ratings, F(1,211)= .2.24, p= .ͳ͵, ηp2= .01, P= 
.32,  or psychosocial causal ratings, F(1,211) = .07, p= .͹ͻ, ηp2<.01, P= .06.  
There was no interaction effect on biological , F(2,166)= 1.79, p= .ͳ͹, ηp2<.02, P= 
.37,  or psychosocial causal ratings, F(2,166)= 1.39, p= .ʹͷ,ηp2= .01, P= .29. 
 
N. Stigma as across experimental groups 
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Figure 9.  Perceived likelihood the client would experience stigma 
O. Journal  instructions 
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